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Abstract
Countries pursuing economic development confront a fundamental obstacle. Reforms that
increase the size of the overall pie are blocked by powerful interests that are threatened
by the growth-inducing changes. This problem is conspicuous in efforts to create effective
capital markets to support economic growth. Controlling owners and managers of
established firms successfully oppose corporate governance reforms that would improve
investor protection and promote capital market development. In this article, we examine
the promise of regulatory dualism as a strategy to diffuse the tension between future growth
and the current distribution of wealth and power. Regulatory dualism seeks to mitigate
political opposition to reforms by permitting the existing business elite to be governed by
the old regime, while allowing other firms to be regulated by a new parallel regime that
is more efficient. Regulatory dualism goes beyond similar but simpler strategies, such as
grandfathering and statutory menus, by incorporating a dynamic element that is key to its
effectiveness, but that requires a sophisticated approach to implementation.
A paradigmatic example of regulatory dualism is offered by Brazil’s “New Market”
(Novo Mercado), a voluntary premium segment within the São Paulo Stock Exchange that
allows companies to commit credibly to significant protection of minority shareholders
without imposing reform on companies controlled by the established elite. Yet regulatory
dualism as a strategy for capital market reform is not unique to Brazil, nor is it suited
just to developing countries. The long-standing U.S. approach to state-level corporate
chartering is arguably better understood as a form of regulatory dualism than – as is the
custom – as a form of regulatory competition, and the same can be said of EU corporate
law post-Centros. The dramatic failure of Germany’s Neuer Markt illustrates some of
the pitfalls of regulatory dualism. If thoughtfully deployed, however, regulatory dualism
holds substantial promise in overcoming political barriers to reform, not just of corporate
governance and capital markets, but of other economic institutions as well.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Regulatory Dualism, Capital Market Reform
JEL Classifications: G32, G38, K22, N26, O16
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I.

Introduction

Countries pursuing economic development confront a fundamental obstacle.
Reforms that, by stimulating growth, will increase the size of the overall pie are blocked
by groups that, having achieved economic success and therefore political influence under
the existing regime, believe that their positions will be threatened by the growth-inducing
reforms.
This problem is conspicuous in developing countries’ efforts to establish effective
capital markets. Both logic and an increasing body of empirical evidence suggest that
economic growth receives strong stimulus from an effective capital market,1 which in
turn requires a substantial and effective legal infrastructure to protect the interests of
minority shareholders in publicly traded business corporations.2
Yet the development of effective shareholder protection to support capital market
development commonly threatens already-established firms and their controlling owners.
1

A large body of literature has sought to demonstrate the positive influence of financial development on
overall economic growth. See, e.g., Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter
Might Be Right, 108 QUART. J. ECON. 717 (1993) (finding that indicators of financial development are
strongly correlated with economic growth, and that predetermined components of financial development
indicators significantly predict future growth rates); Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and
Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1998) (finding a positive correlation between stock market
liquidity and banking development and the contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998)
(finding that industrial sectors which are more dependent on external finance grow disproportionately faster
in countries with well-developed financial markets); Valentina Bruno & Stijn Classens, Corporate
Governance and Regulation: Can There be Too Much of a Good Thing?, WP 4140, World Bank Pol. Res.
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956329 (companies with good corporate governance rely more
heavily on external finance).
2
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, in particular, have
sought to make the case that, as an empirical matter, strong shareholder protection laws are an important
prerequisite for vibrant capital markets and, perhaps, overall economic development. Representative
examples of a prominent series of articles are La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131 (1997); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000). Admittedly, the strength of these
empirical results has been questioned. See, e.g., Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or
Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-Director Index’ under Consistent Coding (2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=894301.
This literature also expresses strong views about the causes of varying levels of shareholder protection in
cross-country comparisons (common law versus civil law origin of the legal regime), and – to a lesser
extent – about the detailed content of such reform (the rights in their “anti-director rights index”). These
and other law-and-finance claims are not relevant to the problem we address here.
A growing literature has challenged the claim that shareholder protection must come exclusively through
legal means, largely by showing that in a number of countries public ownership preceded legal protection –
that is, law was demand driven rather than an instrument to develop an ownership structure. See, e.g.,
Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Hannes Wagner, The Origins of the German Corporation – Finance,
Ownership and Control, 10 REV. FIN. 537 (2006); Brian R. Cheffins, History and the Global Corporate
Governance Revolution: The U.K. Perspective, 43 BUS. HIST. 87, 100 (2001); Franklin Allen & Jun Qian,
Comparing Legal and Alternative Institutions in Finance and Commerce (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136168 (on China and India). These results are not
inconsistent with the claim that a strong legal infrastructure is helpful, and ultimately perhaps essential, to
the creation of robust capital markets.
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First, it shifts both wealth and corporate power (and ultimately political power as well)
away from the controlling owners and toward public shareholders. In particular, by
reducing self-dealing, effective minority protection lowers the value of controlling shares.
And by constraining control, it also opens governance of the corporation to outside
influence. Second, effective shareholder protection facilitates the financing of potential
competitors, since new firms generally need outside equity financing more than do wellestablished firms. These threats give the controlling owners and managers of established
firms a powerful incentive to resist expansion of the legal protection afforded
shareholders. And, because those owners and managers generally have strong influence
over the political process, they are frequently in a position to make their resistance to
reform effective.
We will call this resistance of the established economic and political elite to
growth-promoting reforms the Olson problem, after the economist who has described it
most eloquently and insightfully.3 The question, then, is what can be done to overcome
the Olson problem – that is, to diffuse the tension between future growth and the current
distribution of wealth and power.
Olson himself pessimistically suggested the intractability of the tension; in his
view, solving the Olson problem may require massive social upheaval, such as revolution
or war, which destroys the existing establishment.4 More optimistic approaches stop
short of destroying the elite and instead mitigate their opposition by protecting their
interests from the growth-inducing reforms.5 In this article, we examine one approach of
the latter type, which we label regulatory dualism.
Regulatory dualism seeks to avoid, or at least mitigate, the Olson problem by
permitting the existing business elite to be governed by the pre-reform regime, while
3
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982). Twenty five years after the publication of
The Rise and Decline of Nations, the balance of more than fifty works attempting to test Olson’s theory of
institutional sclerosis was found to be positive. See Jac C. Heckelman, Explaining the Rain: The Rise and
Decline of Nations after 25 Years, 74 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 18 (2007), for a review of this literature. The
political economy of capital market development, in particular, is interpreted in Olson-like terms by
Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003).
Olson-type resistance to capital market development can be seen with particular clarity in the historical
experience of England, the first industrial nation. England had arguably achieved sufficient legal and
economic sophistication to permit incorporation as a right and broad public markets for corporate stock by
the early eighteenth century. It was, however, not until the second half of the nineteenth century that this
level of development was achieved. The requisite legal infrastructure was effectively blocked by existing
corporations, which sought to defend from well-capitalized competition the effective monopoly conferred
by the charter for which they had commonly paid political bribes, and by small unincorporated businesses,
which also wished to avoid the strong competition that might be offered them by a publicly-traded
corporation with its access to large amounts of capital. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW:
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844 (2000). See also Franks et. al., supra note
2, and Cheffins, supra note 2, who argue that in the U.K. reputation allowed local elites to raise public
capital, which made public financing available only to the existing elite.
4
OLSON, supra note 5.
5
In conceptual terms, a strategy of protecting elites so that they will not block reform is similar to
Acemoglu and Robinson’s development of constrained democracy as a means to persuade the elite not to
resort to repression to maintain political and therefore economic power. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES
A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (2006).

4

pursuing growth by allowing other businesses to be governed by a reformed regime. Put
in terms of capital market and shareholder protection, regulatory dualism establishes a
new and more rigorous shareholder protection regime, operating parallel to the existing
one, that is open to any new or existing firm that wishes to make use of it. The
maintenance of the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders in existing
firms insulates the interests of established elites, while more effective shareholder
protection makes public financing available to the entrepreneurial sector, thereby
expanding the capital market’s capacity to support economic growth.6
To be sure, regulatory dualism is not without costs to the elites. However, the two
more extreme alternatives, comprehensive reform and no reform, also impose costs on
the elite. Comprehensive reform brings a direct transfer of corporate wealth and power to
public shareholders, the improvement of financing options available to competitors, and –
as an ultimate consequence – reduction in the political clout of the currently controlling
owners vis-à-vis outside investors and new businesses. On the other hand, seeking to
block all reform can be expensive, not just directly but by upsetting the elites’
relationship with previous allies, such as government officials and stock exchange
owners. Worse, extreme intransigence toward reform could lead to general economic
decline harmful to all classes, and might produce a popular backlash that seriously
damages the economic and political position of the current elite.
Given the alternatives, regulatory dualism can provide an attractive compromise
from the elites’ standpoint, since it avoids the costs of blocking all reform, dilutes the
costs of sweeping legal changes, and reduces the political pressure for more
comprehensive reform. A dual regulatory regime preserves the legal entitlements of
incumbents, at least initially, thus avoiding the immediate economic and political costs
associated with stronger minority investor rights at the firm level. The immediate
economic and political costs associated with a dual regulatory regime are principally
those stemming from increased competition. But if the new firms are expected to
concentrate in different industries than the established ones – the “new” as opposed to the
“traditional” economy – the slope of the incumbents’ decline may be gentle enough to
allow them to move their wealth out of the old businesses in time. The result is that, even
if the elites ultimately lose their economic and political dominance, they can still protect
most of their wealth, perhaps permanently.7
Our particular focus here is on dual regulatory regimes as a solution to the Olson
problem. Multiple regulatory regimes can play other roles as well. In particular, it is
6

Bebchuk and Neeman have modeled the impact of different interest groups on the degree of investor
protection. They argue that the political influence of insiders of publicly traded firms leads to an inefficient
level of investor protection, a result that is only partially attenuated by countervailing pressures by
entrepreneurs who want to take new firms public. Lucian Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection
and Interest Group Politics, REV. FIN. STUD. (2009). Regulatory dualism can mitigate these political
economy barriers to an efficient level of investor protection by isolating the legal regimes of incumbents
from those of new firms seeking to raise equity capital.
7
The decline may not be linear. The success of the “new” economy and economic growth generally may
act as a catalyst for further reform, a possibility that the elite presumably will incorporate in its strategic
calculus. As should already be apparent, the outcome of that calculus will depend heavily on local factors;
while the structure of the analysis is general, the parameter values will depend on a country’s particular
circumstances. See Part V(D) infra.
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helpful to distinguish what we term regulatory dualism from both regulatory
diversification and regulatory competition. For clarity, we offer characterizations here –
in sharply delineated, ideal type terms – of each of these three rationales for maintaining
multiple regulatory regimes.
Regulatory Diversification.
The actors being regulated are not
homogeneous in their needs for regulation. Consequently, it is efficient to
maintain two or more parallel forms of regulation, with each form designed to
deal with the characteristics of a distinct set of actors.
Regulatory Competition. The actors being regulated are relatively
homogeneous, with the consequence that a single regulatory regime would, in
principle, be most efficient. But – perhaps owing to laxity, ignorance, or ideology
– a single agency with a monopoly on regulatory authority cannot be trusted to
adopt the efficient pattern of regulation. The regulated actors have an incentive to
be governed by an efficient regulatory regime – for example, so that they can
attract patrons. Creating multiple regulators with overlapping jurisdictions, so
that the regulated actors can choose the regulatory regime to which they will be
subject, puts the various regulators in competition with each other, as they seek to
attract, or not to lose, actors subject to their system of regulation.
Regulatory Dualism.
As with regulatory competition, a single
homogeneous regulatory regime for all actors would be most efficient. The
preexisting system of regulation – the established regime – has however been
captured by a subset of the actors that it regulates and inefficiently permits those
actors to pursue their private interests. A second, more efficient system of
regulation – the reformist regime – is created, and is made available to all actors.
Meanwhile, the established regime is maintained and is also made available to all
actors, whether they have previously been governed by that regime or not.
Maintaining the established regime reduces the incentive, for those who benefit
from that regime, to oppose creation of the reformist regime.8
An important difference between regulatory competition and regulatory dualism –
in the ideal types we have defined here – is that regulatory competition causes the various
regulatory regimes to converge toward the efficient regime, while under regulatory
dualism the alternative regulatory regimes remain divergent. Indeed, under regulatory
dualism, the introduction of the reformist regime may actually cause the established
regime to become even less efficient than it would be if it were the sole regime, since the
reformist regime draws off some of the constituency for reform of the established regime.
Thus, in contrast to regulatory competition, regulatory dualism creates a dynamic in
which the choice between two regimes of differing efficiency actually reduces rather than
increases pressure to reform the less efficient (established) regime. Put in Albert
8

We might define a fourth regulatory strategy – regulatory experimentation – that is effectively a
combination of regulatory diversification and regulatory competition. In regulatory experimentation, it is
unclear which system of regulation is most efficient, or perhaps even whether efficiency calls for one
system or multiple systems. For this reason, alternative experimental systems of regulation are created,
either in different jurisdictions or in a single jurisdiction, and then compared to see which function best,
with an eye to replicating, ultimately, the best system(s). The Brandeisian notion of federated states as
“laboratories of democracy” reflects this approach to regulation.
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Hirschman’s famous terms9, the opportunity to exit to the reformist regime softens the
voice calling for reform of the established regime. But, paradoxically, that is precisely
the result desired both by those who choose the established regime and those who choose
the reformist regime.
Regulatory diversification, regulatory competition, and regulatory dualism are not
mutually exclusive. All three can be present to some degree when actors are given a
choice concerning the regulatory regime that will govern them. Perhaps for this reason,
the extensive literature that deals with what is loosely termed “regulatory competition” –
including the conspicuous subset of that literature that focuses on corporate chartering –
does not always deal just with regulatory competition of the ideal type we define above,
but also or instead deals with phenomena that are better described as regulatory
diversification or regulatory dualism.
Our principal objective here is to identify and analyze regulatory dualism as a
phenomenon distinct from – and arguably as or more important than – regulatory
competition. We introduce the concept of regulatory dualism by examining a recent and
apparently successful Brazilian effort directed at capital market development. At the core
of the Brazilian approach is the creation, within the São Paulo Stock Exchange, of a
“New Market” (Novo Mercado) for publicly traded securities that exists parallel to the
pre-existing exchange institutions and regulations. The Novo Mercado, whose listing
standards offer far more protection to noncontrolling shareholders than does the old
regime, is open, on a voluntary basis, to both new and existing firms that are prepared to
comply with its requirements. Meanwhile, the old regime remains available to both old
and new firms as well.
Brazil’s Novo Mercado is a paradigm example of regulatory dualism. It is not,
however, the only example. Germany, for instance, tried a similar approach in the late
1990s, only to abandon it as a dramatic failure a few years later. Corporate chartering in
the United States, long analyzed as an example of regulatory competition, also has strong
elements of regulatory dualism. In the U.S., controlling shareholders and managers
desiring a regulatory regime that will help insulate them from market forces can
incorporate in their home state, where they can exercise political influence, while firms
for which access to the capital markets on favorable terms is more important can instead
incorporate in Delaware, where no class of corporate stakeholders – controlling or
noncontrolling shareholders, managers, employees, or consumers – has significant direct
influence on the political process. Thus, contrary to the conventional characterization,
Delaware corporate law might most appropriately be seen as complementary to, rather
than as competitive with, the corporate law offered in other states. Were it not for the
protectionist corporate law offered by other states, Delaware’s nationally-available
market-friendly corporate law might not be politically viable, and vice versa. The
European Union’s recent steps toward permitting greater choice of jurisdiction for
incorporation also has much of the character of regulatory dualism, leaving established
firms to be governed by the pre-existing local corporate and capital markets law shaped
by the political power structure of their state of original incorporation, while permitting
9

ALBERT HIRSCHMAN,
AND STATES (1970).

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
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new firms to seek out an alternative regulatory regime. We examine below each of these
efforts at a strategy of regulatory dualism.
Our exposition proceeds as follows: Part II describes Brazil’s recent efforts to
reform its equity markets, after decades of political paralysis, through an alternative New
Market created within the established stock exchange. Part III describes other efforts at
regulatory dualism, including the premium stock exchange segment created in Germany
with the Frankfurt “Neuer Markt,” as well as the systems of corporate chartering adopted
in the U.S. and, much more recently, in the EU. Part IV compares regulatory dualism
with related regulatory strategies such as grandfathering, statutory menus, and default
rules. Part V explores alternative sources for the reformist regime, from private
regulatory organizations to independent foreign states. Part VI discusses regulatory
dualism in applications other than corporate law. Part VII concludes.

II.

Brazil’s Novo Mercado

A.

Brazil before the Novo Mercado

We begin by focusing on Brazil as a prototypical example of regulatory dualism.
As we shall see, both the need for reform and the Olson problem were particularly acute
in Brazil. Indeed, the Novo Mercado experiment was deliberately designed to
circumvent the political clout of established firms in obstructing legislative reform that
was badly needed to improve minority investor protection.
During most of its history, Brazil’s capital markets were largely underdeveloped
and, therefore, unavailable as a stable source of debt and equity financing for companies
looking to pursue investment opportunities.10 As a result, Brazilian corporations relied
largely on retained earnings, government and bank loans and, for a handful of large
conglomerates, extra-jurisdictional financing in foreign currency.11 Smaller firms were
therefore capital constrained, having to rely on bank loans at high interest rates and short
maturity terms as their principal sources of financing. Brazilian economists and
policymakers had long argued that this scarcity of long-term capital took a substantial toll
on development.12
10

Between 1890 and 1914, however, Brazil experienced a period of fairly developed capital markets.
Before World War I, Brazil’s stock markets were the second largest in Latin America and had an estimated
480 listed companies, the largest number in Latin America. Both the number of publicly traded firms as a
percentage of the population and the ratio of bond issues to GDP were higher in 1913 than they are today.
See Aldo Musacchio, Law Versus Contracts: Shareholder Protections and Ownership Concentration in
Brazil, 1890-1950, 82 BUS. HIST. REV. 445, 449 (2008), and ALDO MUSACCHIO, EXPERIMENTS IN
FINANCIAL DEMOCRACY (2009).
11
See, e.g., Pérsio Arida et al., Credit, Interest, and Jurisdictional Uncertainty: Conjectures on the Case of
Brazil, in INFLATION TARGETING, DEBT AND THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE (Francesco Giavazzi et al. eds.,
2005) (describing the absence of a long-term domestic credit market in Brazil); MB Associados, Desafios e
Oportunidades para o Mercado de Capitais Brasileiro (2000), available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br
(noting the historical insignificance of Brazilian capital markets and the prominent role of governmental
loans as a source of long-term financing).
12
See, e.g., JOSÉ ANTONIO PIMENTA BUENO, DIREITO PÚBLICO BRAZILEIRO E ANÁLISE DA CONSTITUIÇÃO
DO IMPÉRIO (1857) (arguing that governmental restrictions to incorporations in Brazil were delaying the
country’s development); MÁRIO HENRIQUE SIMONSEN, BRASIL 2002 118 (1972) (attributing the
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Brazil’s failure to develop a sustainable capital market was not due to ignorance
about the relation between finance and economic development. The creation of
indigenous financial markets to spur Brazil’s industrial and economic growth has
periodically emerged as a central political issue since the mid-nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, consistent with Olson’s predictions, a close look at the country’s history
reveals that legal reforms attempting to create the preconditions for capital market
development invariably faced significant resistance from established interest groups that
benefited from the status quo.13
At least since the mid-twentieth century, scholars and policymakers have
identified the lack of adequate minority investor protection as a major hurdle to capital
market development in Brazil.14 Nevertheless, when the military government undertook
to promote capital market development in the 1960s, it adopted an “all-carrot-no-stick”
strategy that granted generous tax incentives for companies to go public without
implementing substantive legal reforms. Scholars at the time hoped that, despite Brazil’s
apparent deficiencies in protecting shareholders and creditors, institutional reform could
follow, rather than precede, the growth in the country’s capital markets.15
The incentives policies encompassed tax cuts for both publicly traded companies
and their investors, as well as a program allowing taxpayers to allocate part of their
federal income tax to make personal investments in listed firms.16 The latter program
made the acquisition of stock in publicly-traded firms effectively free from the
perspective of investors, since the price was paid by the federal government. These
investments were made through shares in special mutual funds (called “157 Funds,” after
Decree 157 of 1967, which created the program), and their proceeds were typically

disadvantage of private Brazilian firms vis-à-vis their state-owned and foreign counterparts to a lack of
financing alternatives); SOLUÇÕES PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO MERCADO DE CAPITAIS BRASILEIRO
(Carlos Antonio Rocca ed., 2001) (citing the lack of financing alternatives to the private sector as one of
the main obstacles to the international competitiveness of the Brazilian economy).
13
For a political economy account of corporate law reforms in Brazil since the 19th century, see Mariana
Pargendler, Family, Friends and the State: A History of Corporate Law and Governance in Brazil (2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
14
See, e.g., FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS, A MISSÃO COOKE NO BRASIL 91 (1949) (proposing that Brazil
adopt a system of shareholder protections similar to that available in the United States in order to overcome
investors’ aversion to equity markets); SIMONSEN, supra note 12, at 124 (arguing that Brazil’s tradition of
closely-held family firms was not due to sociological traits, but to the failure of existing corporate laws to
adequately protect minority shareholders).
15
David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82
YALE L. J. 1, 45-6 (1972) (although it was well known that “the rules governing creditor and shareholder
rights were imperfect, that courts were neither accessible nor efficient, and that sanctions were ineffective,”
there was initial hope that “as the markets boomed they would generate pressure for improvement in the
private system”). This position has since been found to have some historical precedent. In both the United
Kingdom and Germany, shareholdings became more dispersed before effective minority shareholder
protection was adopted. See Franks et al., supra note 2; Julian Franks et al., Spending Less Time with
Family: The Decline in Family Ownership in the UK, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND
THE WORLD 582 (Randall Morck ed., 2005) (describing the timing of dispersal of shareholdings in the UK).
16
For a detailed description of the tax incentives policies adopted in Brazil, see David M. Trubek, Law,
Planning and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market, 72-73 N.Y.U. (N.Y.U. Graduate School of
Business Administration, Institute of Finance Bulletin Nos. 72-73, Apr. 1971).
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directed to the purchase of non-voting preferred stock in publicly traded companies.17
The upshot of this program was rapid capital market growth, but not the creation of a
sustainable source of market financing. Academic supporters of the government’s
incentives policy later acknowledged that their confidence in the program was mistaken,
and that they had underestimated the State’s capture by powerful economic groups.18
While these policies failed to establish sustainable capital markets, they
succeeded in erecting hefty barriers to future law reforms. The tax incentives of the
1960s and 1970s triggered dramatic growth in the number of Brazilian publicly traded
companies, but virtually all such firms had a controlling shareholder and a
disenfranchised public shareholder base comprised mainly of holders of non-voting
preferred stock.19 As a result, the same family-controlled corporations that were induced
to go public by the government became a powerful interest group that would later block
legal changes to improve minority protections; reforms would divert both wealth and
power to the large ranks of new public shareholders. In 1971 the controlling shareholders
of publicly traded firms founded the Brazilian Association of Public Companies, a
lobbying group that would become highly successful in opposing investor protection
reforms.20 Moreover, the 1960s saw a rapid proliferation of state-owned enterprises in
Brazil, many of which were publicly traded.21 Therefore, the State itself, as a controlling
shareholder of the largest listed corporations in Brazil,22 would have independent reasons
to oppose legal reforms that could transfer wealth to minority shareholders in subsequent
years.23
While legal reform to support capital market development remained on the
government’s public agenda, such reform as occurred was ineffective. A new
Corporations Law enacted in 1976 was officially aimed at establishing the “requisite
legal structure to strengthen the country’s capital markets” through the “creation of a
17

Id. at 62. Since 1932, Brazilian firms were permitted to issue non-voting stock so long as these securities
provided either a dividend or a liquidation preference vis-à-vis common stock. In many firms, non-voting
preferred shares only had a liquidation preference. It was not until the legal reforms of 1997 and 2001 that
Brazilian corporations were required to grant more substantial preferences (such as favorable dividend
treatment, or tag-along rights) to preferred non-voting shares.
18
See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 15, at 48 (acknowledging that “the emerging structure of the Brazilian
financial market seems to be one in which a very few powerful groups are actively supported by
government policy, and where the government, in turn, is just as dependent on the success of these
groups”).
19
The São Paulo Stock Exchange had 200 listed companies in 1970; by 1977 the number had reached 452.
MB Associados, supra note 11, at 30.
20
See note 26 infra and accompanying text; see also Luciano Coutinho & Flavio Marcilio Rabelo, Brazil:
Keeping It in the Family 49, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPMENT (Charles P. Oman ed., 2004)
(describing the role of the Brazilian Association of Public Companies, as a “traditional representative of the
business elite,” in successfully opposing corporate governance reforms in 2001).
21
See, e.g., THOMAS J. TREBAT, BRAZIL’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 59 (1983) (noting that the
participation of state-owned enterprises among the largest Brazilian firms soared from 12 in 1962 to 23 in
1975).
22
Visão, Brazil Report 46 (1974) (reporting that state-owned enterprises held nearly 50% of the total net
book value of the 1,000 largest firms in Brazil).
23
See Pargendler, supra note 13 (describing how the alignment of alignment of interests between wealthy
controlling families and the State itself, as the controlling shareholder of the largest Brazilian firms,
consistently eroded minority shareholder rights in Brazil).
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regime that assures to minority shareholders the respect for clear and equitable rules.”24
Yet, despite the statute’s expressed good intentions and a very contentious legislative
effort to include additional minority protections,25 the overall contribution of the new law
to improved investor rights was modest.
The Olson problem was conspicuous in these failed efforts to improve minority
shareholder protection in the new Corporations Law. To begin with, the new law
resolved the ongoing dispute over limits on the dilution of voting rights in favor of
controlling families: the statute actually increased the existing ceiling for the issuance of
non-voting preferred shares from 50% to up to 2/3 of the firm’s total equity capital,
which meant that a shareholder could sustain uncontested control of a firm by holding
less than 17% of the company’s total equity.
Similarly, a Senate amendment to the bill adding a mandatory bid requirement for
minority shares in the event of a change of control (so-called “tag-along rights”) triggered
a forceful reaction by the Brazilian Association of Public Companies, which launched a
campaign demanding a presidential veto of this section of the statute.26 The president
refused to exercise his veto power,27 but only seven days after the Corporation Law came
into force, the federal government issued an “interpretative” decree stating that the
mandatory bid rule only applied to voting shares held by minority investors.28 Because
public shareholders held mostly non-voting shares, the decree’s interpretation, which was
upheld in court, significantly eroded this minority protection.
After a “lost decade” of debt crisis, stagflation, and sharply decreasing growth
rates in the 1980s, Brazil initiated a modernization strategy in the 1990s that, inspired by
the Washington consensus, replaced import-substitution subsidies with international
competition and inaugurated a comprehensive privatization process. The reduction in the
barriers to foreign capital enabled a major influx of foreign investment into the country,
and the São Paulo Stock Exchange saw a record increase in its market capitalization
compared to prior periods.29 Yet at the same time there was a steady decline in the
number of publicly listed firms and in the liquidity of local markets.30 By December
1997, a single company, the telecom firm Telebrás, accounted for almost 60% of the
Brazilian market’s trading volume. This was in large part a direct consequence of a
government-sponsored reform to the Corporations Law in 1997.31 This new law removed
24

Federal Law 6,404/76, as amended, remains Brazil’s principal corporate law statute.
See MODESTO CARVALHOSA, NOVA LEI DAS SOCIEDADES ANÔNIMAS 11 (1977). Even though the House
had only one week to introduce changes to the initial draft, the representatives produced 240 proposed
amendments, which were largely aimed at eliminating a multitude of new privileges to financial
conglomerates. Id. at 12.
26
Id. at 17.
27
Partial presidential vetoes were, and still are, legally permissible in Brazil.
28
See CARVALHOSA, supra note 25, at 17.
29
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in Brazil jumped from an average of 8% in the 1980s to
an average 26.3% between 1993 and 1998, while the ratio of trading volume to GDP increased from 2.7%
to 15.6% in the same periods. MB Associados, supra note 11, at 25. By the early 1990s São Paulo’s had
become the only active stock exchange in Brazil, as a scandal involving default by a major speculator in the
options market in the late 1980s led to the demise of the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange.
30
As a result, the trading volume on the Bovespa fell from more than $191 billion in 1997 to $101 billion
in 2000 and $65 billion in 2001 (available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br).
31
Federal Law 9,457/1997.
25
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even the limited statutory protections then available to minority shareholders upon
control sales, such as statutory appraisal rights at book value and the weakened
mandatory bid rule, in order to allow the federal government to maximize its privatization
proceeds. Commentators denounced the project as a confirmation of how the oligarchic
character of Brazilian capitalism hindered the creation of effective capital markets.32
By promoting acquisitions without exit opportunities for the minority, the
abolition of the mandatory bid rule exposed the serious deficiencies in the legal
protection of minority shareholders in case of freeze-outs and going private transactions.
There were, for example, no legal impediments to undisclosed share purchases by
controlling shareholders in the public market. Moreover, as delisting tender offers were
not then subject to appraisal or fairness requirements, many companies went private
through the payment of offer prices below the book value of the company.33 A
subsequent estimate indicated that Brazil had the highest levels of private benefits of
control among 39 countries surveyed for the decade between 1990 and 2000.34
The expectation of minority expropriation depressed share prices, which in turn
deterred further offerings. Brazilian companies that still sought equity investments at
reasonable valuations did so by circumventing local markets and listing almost
exclusively on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), thereby piggybacking on more
protective NYSE listing requirements and on the application to foreign issuers of
elements of U.S. securities laws that accompanied NYSE listing.35 However, a NYSE
listing provided an alternative to only a limited range of firms; such a listing was too

32

Modesto Carvalhosa, Comentários a Lei de Sociedades Anônimas LXXVIII (4th ed., 2002).
Maria Helena Santana, The Novo Mercado 1, 12, in FOCUS: NOVO MERCADO AND ITS FOLLOWERS (IFC,
2008).
34
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 49 J. FIN.
538 (2004). Dyck and Zingales compared the price paid for a controlling block to the market share price
following the change of control in a sample of 393 transactions, and found that private benefits of control
ranged from -4% in Japan to 65% in Brazil. Id. According to a different study, which used dual-class price
differentials to estimate private benefits of control, an average Brazilian controlling shareholder could
expect to extract up to 33.3% of the value of the company by holding as little of one sixth of total cash flow
rights. Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis
(2000), 68 J. FIN ECON. 325, 327 (2003).
35
Some scholars have advanced a “bonding hypothesis” to explain the cross-listing of foreign issuers on
U.S. exchanges. According to this theory, firms opt to subject themselves to higher disclosure standards
and prospects of enforcement in the United States in order to credibly commit to minority protection and
lower their cost of capital. For a description of this argument in the legal literature, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 235 (2007). For empirical
works supporting a bonding hypothesis, and finding a premium associated with U.S. cross-listings, see
Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (2004)
(finding that foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. had a Tobin’s q ratio 16.5% higher than other companies
from the same countries); Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Competitive than London in
Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (2009) (stating that
the U.S. cross-listing premium persists after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and cannot be
replicated by a London cross-listing). Nevertheless, there is also evidence of deficient enforcement of
securities laws against foreign firms cross-listed on the U.S. vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts. See
Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private Enforcement against
Non-U.S. Issuers, __ YALE L.J. __ (2009).
33
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expensive for small Brazilian issuers, which then lacked not only equity financing but
also long-term debt financing options in the private sector.36
By the turn of the century, the prospects for Brazilian capital markets looked
increasingly grim. Only eight companies had launched an IPO on the São Paulo Stock
Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo – Bovespa, later renamed BM&F Bovespa)37
between 1995 and 2000.38 Following a study by prominent Brazilian economists
commissioned by the São Paulo Stock Exchange,39 the Exchange confronted the fact that
inaction both by it and the legislature threatened the very survival of Brazilian capital
markets.40 The result was the Exchange’s design of a dual regulatory regime aimed at
curing, for new firms, the main legal deficiencies in investment protection while
bypassing the political barriers to reforming the legal regime that protected existing
public firms. The final product was the Exchange’s December 2000 launch of the Novo
Mercado (New Market), a premium exchange listing segment subject to listing
requirements that imposed much stricter corporate governance rules than those provided
under Brazilian law.41
B.

The Novo Mercado Standards

When the São Paulo Stock Exchange took up the problem of reform, the
contemporaneous success of the Deutsche Börse’s initiative with its own New Market –
the Neuer Markt – offered an attractive model. The Brazilian effort, however, was much
more ambitious. The German experiment, which we describe in more detail below, was
aimed only at attracting high-tech firms. The Brazilian Novo Mercado, in contrast, did
not focus on a particular industry or type of firm. Both old and new firms in any industry
were welcome to join the Novo Mercado so long as they were willing to comply with its
requirements.
From the outset, the São Paulo Stock Exchange’s goal was to address the flaws in
the investor protection regime plaguing local capital markets. Following a broad
consultation process with various local and foreign market participants, public agencies,
36

See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Virtually the only local source of long-term financing was the
Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), which offered generous long-term loans at below-market
interest rates to the private sector. Nevertheless, politics and its historical industrialist focus favored
established firms and rendered the Bank an imperfect substitute for effective capital markets.
37
Bovespa merged with São Paulo’s Commodities and Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Mercadorias e Futuros
– BM&F) in 2007 to form BM&F Bovespa, a publicly-traded firm listed on the Novo Mercado.
38
Santana, supra note 33, at 9.
39
MB Associados, supra note 11.
40
Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective Are Capital Markets in Exerting Governance on
Corporations? Lessons of Recent Experience with Private and Public Legal Rules in Emerging Markets 20
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=323163 (describing the creation of Novo Mercado as a “quasiprivate effort to make up for the perceived shortcomings of legislative reform”).
41
While the Brazilian Congress finally amended the Corporations Law in late 2001, the Olson problem was
again apparent: the reform was quite limited. The new statute (Law 10,303) continued to permit the
issuance of non-voting preferred shares, but the ratio to total capital was reduced from 2/3 to 50% for new
firms. The 2001 law also reintroduced a mandatory bid rule, but only partially: it applied only to common
shares and entitled common shareholders to receive only 80% of the price paid for the controlling block.
Other protective provisions in the statute – such as the right of minority shareholders to call a special
meeting to deliberate on transactions tainted by the controlling shareholders’ conflicts of interest – were
vetoed by Brazil’s President.
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and investors, the Exchange created a standard that would operate like a privately-created
law for publicly-traded business corporations. The idea was that a contractual solution
would circumvent the persistent legislative capture thwarting legal reform.42
The Novo Mercado listing standards were entirely voluntary. A company had to
choose to subject itself to the higher standards; companies were free to remain listed on,
or to obtain their initial listing on, the traditional segment. The strategy was to attract to
the Novo Mercado principally new firms that had an interest in obtaining equity capital at
the lower cost that would result from more stringent corporate governance protection for
shareholders. Because the Novo Mercado left intact the regime applicable to old firms, it
served to defuse the Olson problem by diluting – or at least deferring – the threat to
established interests.
This is not to say that old firms were indifferent to these developments. On the
contrary, they showed a keen interest in seeing the Novo Mercado initiatives fail. In
classic Olson fashion, most of the opposition came from large and well-established
Brazilian corporations that, having a strong presence in Brazil’s capital markets and
access to international financing sources, saw little to gain from this new project.43 The
Brazilian Association of Public Companies argued that the adoption of alien corporate
governance standards unsuited to local conditions could harm the performance of
Brazilian corporations.44 Yet this reaction from old firms was significantly milder than
their successful efforts to block or dilute previous legislative proposals.
The dual regulatory approach goes a long way in explaining the established firms’
complacency vis-à-vis the Novo Mercado. Unlike legislative reform, the Novo Mercado
regime did not affect the existing firms’ legal rights and duties; there was no wealth or
power transfer from controlling shareholders to minority shareholders of legacy
companies. On the contrary, old firms may have thought that the Novo Mercado could in
fact serve to reduce the demand for comprehensive statutory reform.45 While these firms
also feared being stigmatized for “suboptimal governance” if they failed to embrace the
Novo Mercado requirements, the fact that the old as well as the new standards remained
permissible for both old and new firms offset somewhat the negative connotation.46
To be sure, while regulatory dualism prevents the old firms from suffering the
adverse distributive consequences of minority protection reforms, it does little to address
the competitive threat from capital market development. There are, however, several
reasons why the existing Brazilian firms likely viewed the potential for increased
competition due to the success of new firms as sufficiently remote as not to pose a real
and present danger. First, the Novo Mercado was an untested experiment and its very

42

CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, NOVO DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO 58 (2006).
Santana, supra note 33, at 12.
44
Relatório Anual da Diretoria (2005), available at www.abrasca.org.
45
Indeed, following the creation of the Novo Mercado the Brazilian Association of Public Companies
began to argue that legal reforms banning non-voting preferred shares were unnecessary precisely because
“voluntary market mechanisms” had emerged to address this issue. See Relatório Anual da Diretoria
(2006) at 24, available at www.abrasca.org.
46
Santana, supra note 33, at 12.
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potential for success was highly uncertain at the outset.47 Since capital market
development is notoriously hard to achieve,48 the political costs of opposing such an
improbable project probably seemed larger than the expected benefits. Second, the most
influential members of the corporate establishment – large state-owned enterprises and
family-controlled conglomerates – were in any case unlikely to be in the same industry
and become direct competitors of the medium-sized firms that were initially expected to
pursue a Novo Mercado listing.49 Finally, the increased foreign competition to which
established firms were being exposed by the worldwide opening of trade in recent years
may have made the reforms, even if successful, more palatable: poor access to capital in
Brazil would not inhibit Brazilian firms’ foreign competitors, and might even hinder
established Brazilian firms in confronting that foreign competition.50 All in all, then, the
Novo Mercado looked like a relatively unthreatening compromise.
The São Paulo Stock Exchange was sensitive about not unduly upsetting existing
firms, which constituted, after all, its principal clientele. Its initial project envisioned the
creation of a single alternative regime – the one-share-one-vote Novo Mercado. This
proved, however, too demanding for the appetite of most existing companies.
Consequently, a more accommodating solution was settled upon, which involved the
creation of a series of three new graduated levels of regulation that culminated in the
Novo Mercado (see Table 1).
As adopted, the overall reform encompassed a four-level system of listings, which
offered progressively higher levels of minority shareholder protection:
(1) Basic (pre-existing legal rules)
(2) Level 1
(3) Level 2
(4) Novo Mercado

47
As described in Part II(E) infra, the Novo Mercado took a while to take off after it was adopted. Two
years after its creation, commentators were skeptical of governance reforms through stock exchange
standards, and attributed the “weak response” to the Novo Mercado experiment to its inability to compete
with the stronger “reputational brand” of the NYSE. John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top? The
Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1807-8 (2002).
48
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. REV. 781, 782 (2001).
49
MB Associados, O Mercado de Capitais Brasileiro Frente aos Desafios Impostos pelas Negociações
Internacionais em Serviços Financeiros 27 (2002), available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br (noting that the
Novo Mercado initially aimed at attracting medium-sized firms with ongoing investment projects).
50
See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 3, at 7 (arguing that “when a country’s borders are open to both trade
and capital flows (…) the opposition to financial development will be most muted and development will
flourish”).

15

Table 1. Main Listing Requirement of Brazil’s Premium Corporate Governance Segments
Novo Mercado

Level 2

Level 1

Common stock

Common stock
Non-voting preferred
stock (with special
voting rights in case of
merger, spin-off and
related-party contracts)

Common stock
Non-voting
preferred stock

100% price

100% price for common
stock
80% for preferred stock

80% price for
common stock*

Yes

Yes

No

Minimum of 5 directors
20% independent
2-year unified term

Minimum of 5 directors
20% independent
2-year unified term

Minimum of 3
directors*

Mandatory tender offer
at “economic value” in
case of delisting

Yes

Yes

No

Financial statements in
accordance with U.S.
GAAP or IFRS

Yes

Yes

No

Minimum free float of
25% of total equity

Yes

Yes

Yes

Disclosure of material
related-party contracts

Yes

Yes

Yes

Disclosure of monthly
equity ownership and
trading by controlling
shareholders, directors
and officers

Yes

Yes

Yes

Public offerings to use
mechanisms favoring
capital dispersion

Yes

Yes

Yes

Securities listed

Mandatory bid rule

Mandatory arbitration
Board of directors

* Mandatory requirement under Brazilian law

The less restrictive of the new segments – named Level 1 and Level 2 – were
given requirements reasonably acceptable to existing companies. For example, they do
not restrict the issuance of preferred non-voting shares. The goal of this graduated scale
was to garner support from existing firms; it gave them the opportunity to receive a good
corporate governance seal for taking part in the premium corporate governance standards
– by moving up, if they chose, from the existing rules to Level 1 or Level 2 – while
making few, or really none, of the meaningful concessions requisite for a Novo Mercado
listing.

16

The highest level, the Novo Mercado, provided a bundle of stricter corporate
governance standards aimed at regaining investor confidence in Brazil’s capital markets.
The creators of the Novo Mercado saw the added value of this bundle of rights as greater
than the sum of its parts – a view which is now widely shared among investors. The
Exchange marketed the segment as a brand for superior corporate governance and did not
permit firms to opt out of any of its listing requirements. It also correctly perceived that
the overall reputational integrity of the segment was critical to its success.51
The central feature of the Novo Mercado was a one-share-one-vote requirement.52
This stricture allowed issuers who listed on this segment to credibly commit to forgo the
myriad of expropriation opportunities which controllers have historically used to exploit
non-voting preferred shareholders in Brazil. Prior to the Novo Mercado, the typical
ownership structure of a Brazilian publicly-traded company featured the simultaneous
presence of a controlling shareholder and a thoroughly disenfranchised set of public
shareholders. Through the extensive use of non-voting stock and, to a lesser extent,
pyramidal structures, controlling shareholders in Brazil had a significant majority of a
company’s voting rights, but typically a minority of its cash-flow rights.53 Indeed, Brazil
had both the world’s largest number of dual-class firms,54 and the largest average gap
between cash-flow and voting rights.55 In economic terms, this ownership pattern
produced two classical types of corporate agency problems – those resulting from the
absence of any external check on the controlling shareholder’s performance in managing
the firm, and those resulting from controlling shareholders’ incentives to engage in theft
and tunneling.
The Novo Mercado’s prohibition of non-voting shares had two direct benefits: it
reduced the opportunities for abuse by giving minority shareholders the ability to voice
their concerns and to attempt to influence corporate action, and – by removing the
substantial wedge between voting and cash-flow rights in most Brazilian public firms – it
limited the controlling shareholders’ incentives for expropriation. A large shareholder
could maintain control, but at the cost of maintaining a matching equity investment,
which would then serve to better align the interests of controlling and minority
shareholders. This meant that, apart from other listing requirements and enforcement
measures, the very capital structure of Novo Mercado firms helped deter tunneling and
51

For a discussion of the role of network effects in the implementation of regulatory dualism through
private organizations, see Part V(B)(2) infra.
52
We use the term “one-share, one-vote” loosely to describe the absence of non-voting shares. Voting caps
and pyramidal structures are not yet prohibited under the current Novo Mercado regulations, although the
São Paulo Stock Exchange has recently proposed an amendment to this effect. See notes 57 and 58 infra
and accompanying text.
53
See, e.g., André Carvalhal-da-Silva & Ricardo Leal, Corporate Governance, Market Valuation and
Dividend Policy in Brazil, 1 FRONTIERS FIN. & ECON. 1 (2004) (finding that, as of 2000, the largest
shareholder in their sample of 225 firms held, on average, 72% of the company’s voting stock and 51% of
its total capital); Ricardo P.C. Leal & André Carvalhal da Silva, Corporate Governance and Value in Brazil
(and in Chile) (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=726261 (noting a
rise in the concentration of voting rights in Brazilian firms from 1998 to 2002).
54
Andre Carvalhal da Silva & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Dual-Class Premium, Corporate Governance
and the Mandatory Bid Rule: Evidence from the Brazilian Stock Market, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 4 (2007).
55
Tatiana Nenova, Control Values and Changes in Corporate Law in Brazil (2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294064.
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self-dealing, thus contributing to the segment’s reputation for superior investor
protection.
Voting caps and pyramidal structures are not prohibited under existing Novo
Mercado regulations, although the São Paulo Stock Exchange is considering an
amendment to that effect.56 The proposed dual-class recapitalization of Novo Mercado
firm Cosan – which, by taking place at the holding company level, would leave the listed
company in formal compliance with the segment’s listing requirements – raised concerns
that companies would begin using alternative transaction structures to circumvent the
Novo Mercado’s rules.57 In response to these developments, the Working Group in
charge of revising the Novo Mercado listing standards recently proposed the adoption of
a new and broader listing standard clarifying that any structures leading to a direct or
indirect violation of the Novo Mercado’s rules and principles will be deemed a violation
of the segment’s listing requirements.58
The Novo Mercado also imposes a mandatory bid rule under which the purchaser
of a controlling block of stock must offer to purchase the rest of the company’s stock at
the same price per share. To be sure, the efficiency of mandatory bid requirements
remains subject to debate.59 In a regime that tolerates an overall high level of private
benefits of control, a mandatory bid rule allows minority shareholders to exit at a fair
price upon control sales and therefore restricts the ability of a controlling shareholder to
receive the capitalized value of the private benefits of control. Mandatory bid
requirements thus operate as a structural protection device that reduces the value of
private benefits, albeit at the cost of preventing some efficient control transfers.60
Another potential benefit of the Novo Mercado’s requirement of a mandatory bid rule is
that, similarly to the one-share-one-vote requirement, it operates as a structural screening
device for the corporate governance quality of firms choosing to take part in the segment.
By preventing controlling shareholders from receiving the capitalized value of their
private benefits of control upon a subsequent control sale, the mandatory bid rule serves
56

Recomendações da Câmara Consultiva do Novo Mercado (2009) [hereinafter “Recommendations”],
available at www.bmfbovespa.com.br.
57
The offer ultimately failed to attract sufficient shareholders to delist Cosan from the Novo Mercado, but
the incident served as a warning about the risks of evasion of the segment’s requirements. Brazil’s Cosan
to Stay on São Paulo Exchange, REUTERS, Apr. 22, 2008.
58
Recommendations, supra note 56.
59
For a discussion of the economic properties of a mandatory bid rule, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 716, 737 (1982) (arguing that unequal
sharing of gains in corporate control transactions maximizes shareholder wealth); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 1994 Q.J. ECON. 957 (positing that the “equal
opportunity rule” followed in other countries may lead to an increase in the incidence of controlling
shareholder structures compared to the market rule followed in the United States); Marcel Kahan, Sales of
Corporate Control, 9 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 368 (1993) (arguing that equal sharing rules may be less efficient
than private control transfers for sales of high fractions of corporate shares); Clas Bergström et al., The
Optimality o the Mandatory Bid Rule, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 433 (1997) (costs of mandatory bid rule
include making control transactions more expensive by implicitly prohibiting partial bids).
60
The tradeoff between encouraging efficient transactions and protecting minority investors from
expropriation upon control sales in countries lacking adequate regulation of going-private transactions
remains open to investigation. From a description of different modalities of extraction of private benefits
of control in operating decisions, control sales and freeze-outs, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 787 (2003).
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to discourage entrepreneurs who expect to extract high private benefits from pursuing a
Novo Mercado listing.
The listing rules also constrain the ability of controlling shareholders and
managers of Novo Mercado firms to renege on their initial commitment to stricter
corporate governance standards by simply exiting the segment. Persons wishing to delist
a firm from the Novo Mercado must first launch a tender offer for the firm’s shares at a
price at least equal to their economic value.61 The tender offer requirements also apply to
delisting decisions by the Exchange for violations of listing rules.62 In addition, the Novo
Mercado regulations permit the BM&F Bovespa to impose fines and suspend stock
trading in case of non-compliance with the segment’s standards.63
The Level 2 requirements track those of the Novo Mercado except that non-voting
shares are permitted and mandatory bid requirements are limited compared to the Novo
Mercado standards. Level 1 is the most lenient of the new listing standards. The listing
requirements impose no new substantive minority rights per se, but only enhanced
disclosure and free float requirements. In fact, because subsequent amendments to the
Corporations Law and changes in regulations by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange
Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – CVM) are transforming most of the
Novo Mercado disclosure requirements into law, labeling Level 1 as a premium corporate
governance standard is fast becoming a misnomer.64 As a result, the Working Group in
charge of revising the requirements for the premium listing segments has recently
proposed the elimination of Level 1 altogether. If approved, firms listed on Level 1
would be required to either migrate to the more demanding Level 2 or Novo Mercado, or
return to the traditional segment.65
C.

One Judiciary for Two Regulatory Regimes

A problem with regulatory dualism – at least when deployed within a single
country, as in Brazil, rather than across multiple states, as in the U.S. and EU approaches
described below – is that, in principle, both of the regulatory regimes must ultimately be
enforced by the same national judiciary. And a weak judiciary is a characteristic problem
in developing countries. Thus, the question arises whether two regulatory regimes can be
made significantly different if they both depend on the same enforcement regime.
In Brazil, the Novo Mercado and Level 2 attempt to avoid the enforcement
difficulties associated with an ineffective judiciary through the provision of mandatory
and institutionalized arbitration for internal affairs disputes.66 Here, as elsewhere, the
conventional drawbacks of arbitration compared to public judicial procedures with
61
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Id., Section 12.
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The CVM was established by the Capital Markets Law (Law 6,385) of 1976, the same year of the
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Commission began taking a truly activist stance toward investor protection. See notes 197-199 infra and
accompanying text.
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Recommendations, supra note 56.
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According to the most recent cross-country comparison by the ‘Doing Business’ division of the World
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See Doing Business 2009: Brazil, available at www.doingbusiness.org.
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respect to corporate law and complex commercial disputes apply.67 In developing
countries like Brazil, however, with weak public commercial courts, arbitration may be
the only domestic means of addressing the enforcement problem. Arbitration procedures
are believed to be faster, as well as more confidential and technical (and thus less subject
to political pressures or corruption), than a typical judicial lawsuit in Brazil.68
The Novo Mercado’s approach to arbitration is cleverly designed to mitigate
arbitration’s weaknesses while maintaining its strengths. The arbitration proceedings are
managed by a permanent Market Arbitration Panel established under the auspices of the
São Paulo Stock Exchange,69 thus adopting a structure that resembles a public court. For
example, the Panel is required to periodically publish the content of the substantive
decisions and the names of the respective arbitrators.70 This ensures a channel of
accountability to, and pressure from, market participants – although the names and other
identifying information about the parties and their lawyers are expressly exempt from
disclosure requirements, which compromises somewhat the system’s transparency. The
Panel regulations also provide that arbitrators may take the Panel’s precedents into
account in their decision making process.71 Moreover, because the arbitration procedure
is administered by the Exchange – an institution having a major stake in the integrity of
the Novo Mercado – the potential for arbitral decisions to disregard policy considerations
and their ex ante impact on other actors’ incentives is also reduced, though not
eliminated. The Panel regulations in fact allow the parties to jointly authorize the
Arbitral Tribunal to decide the dispute based on equity considerations.72
The effectiveness of the Market Arbitration Panel remains untested, since no
arbitration decisions have been reported to date. The scarcity of complaints may indicate
a high degree of compliance and investor comfort with the governance of Novo Mercado
firms; the mere availability of arbitral tribunals may have served as a check on extreme
forms of opportunistic transactions by controlling shareholders and managers. However,
the Brazilian judiciary also experienced a similar dearth of complaints concerning
67

For instance, arbitral panels have an infamous tendency to “split the baby” and find a mutually
acceptable, even if unprincipled, solution to the dispute in question, while public courts can perform better
in holding parties to their incentives for performance ex ante. For a discussion of the advantages of public
courts over arbitration, see Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 34 (2008).
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Public courts must ultimately enforce arbitration awards in the absence of voluntary compliance by the
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subject to a limited scope of review.
69
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capital market expertise to compose the Panel, and the applicable regulations provide that the parties should
preferably, although not necessarily, appoint arbitrators who are members of the Panel. Thus, the
reputations of prominent individuals are placed behind the arbitration procedure. In addition, before the
award is made final, the Arbitral Tribunal needs to submit a draft to the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the
Panel, who, without interfering with the arbitrators’ judgment, may propose changes to the formal aspects
of the award and draw attention to other substantive aspects of the dispute. Market Arbitration Panel
Regulation, Sections 7.8 and 9.2.1.
70
Id., Section 9.13.
71
Id.
72
Id., Section 7.12.7.

20

corporate governance matters for many years, without warranting a conclusion about the
exemplary behavior of Brazilian companies with respect to minority protection.73
Minority shareholders may simply have recognized a lost cause when they saw one, or
resorted instead to an increasingly investor-friendly Securities and Exchange
Commission to file complaints.74
All in all, the Novo Mercado is making a plausible effort at leveraging its
arbitration panel to create an alternative enforcement solution for the new, more rigorous
market regime. Whether the balance struck in the Novo Mercado’s enforcement
mechanism is effective will depend on the Novo Mercado’s actual operation, to which we
now turn.
D.

Experience with the Novo Mercado

The Novo Mercado eventually became the highlight of Bovespa’s premium listing
segments, but that success developed only over time. From its official launch in
December 2000 until 2002, the Novo Mercado had no listings, and did not become a
mainstream option for IPOs until 2004. The slow start was due in no small part to the
fragility of equity markets worldwide, and in particular the disappearance of IPOs
following the burst of the dot-com bubble and the U.S. corporate governance scandals in
the early 2000s. Because the Novo Mercado was primarily designed for new public
firms, the dearth of new IPOs was especially damaging. It was not until 2005 that the
market for Brazilian IPOs became substantial, which resulted in the Novo Mercado
segment experiencing a boom in new listings.
As a result, during the 2000 through 2004 period the São Paulo Stock Exchange
focused on persuading existing firms to join Levels 1 and 2, which were less demanding
and did not directly constrain existing controlling shareholders. As early as 2001, 15
firms that previously traded on the traditional segment had moved to a Level 1 listing.
Figures 1 and 2 below show the aggregate number of firms listed in the different
premium segments and the distributions of IPOs per segment from 2001 through 2009.

73
See Paulo Cezar Aragão, A CVM em Juízo: Limites e Possibilidades, 89 REVISTA DO ADVOGADO 38, 40
(2006) (noting that in the more than 30 years of authority of the 1940 Corporations Law, there was only
one judicial lawsuit on the duties and liabilities of managers of Brazilian corporations).
74
See notes 197-199 infra and accompanying text.
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Source: BM&F Bovespa

Source: BM&F Bovespa

As anticipated by its founders, a significant majority of Novo Mercado listings
took place in connection with the firms’ IPOs – that is, at the point in time in which the
incentives of controlling shareholders to make corporate governance concessions are at
their maximum in order to reduce their cost of capital. More important, over 72% of all
Brazilian IPOs were listed on the Novo Mercado, and all new Brazilian listings since
2004 took place on one of the premium listing segments.75 Indeed, the National
Association of Investment Banks used its self-regulatory authority to prevent its members
from underwriting new offers which did not, at a minimum, satisfy a Level 1 listing.76 Of
these, the overwhelming majority of new registrants opted for the Novo Mercado.77
75

See www.bmfbovespa.com.br.
ANBID Self-Regulatory Code for Public Offerings for the Distribution or Acquisition of Securities, Art.
6 (2002).
77
Many of the recent IPOs that took place outside of the Novo Mercado did so due to regulatory
restrictions on foreign control that prevented firms from issuing only voting shares without governmental
76
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For most already-listed firms, the existence of a substantial amount of non-voting
preferred shares held by minority shareholders was an impediment to migration to the
Novo Mercado. Out of more than 100 firms that listed on the Novo Mercado between
2002 and 2009, only approximately 20% had previously been listed on the traditional
segment.
This is so even though the CVM has permitted “Pareto superior”
reorganizations that eliminate the non-voting shares, with the efficiency gains shared
between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders. In effect, these reorganizations
compensate the controlling shareholders for giving up rights to expropriate the
noncontrolling shareholders.78 In Brazil, this is accomplished by permitting controlling
shareholders to extract a premium upon the conversion of preferred shares into common
shares in anticipation of a migration to the Novo Mercado, so long as the minority
shareholders separately approve the transaction.79 Indeed, at least four firms have
approved the conversion of preferred shares to common shares at premiums to common
shareholders ranging from 9% to 28%, but substantial transaction costs and information
asymmetries hinder the occurrence of additional efficient migrations.80
But this is not the entire story. Although the difficulties in unwinding “leveraged”
governance structures may be holding back firms listed in other premium standards from
listing on the Novo Mercado, this is not the case for existing public companies moving to
Levels 1 or 2. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of companies listed in the
traditional segment at the time of the launch of Bovespa’s premium standards have not
migrated even to Level 1 or Level 2, and have not otherwise made meaningful voluntary
governance concessions. The obvious explanation is that they lack any incentive to make
concessions. Many of these firms went public in the distant past (and often for tax
reasons), and have little interest in giving up their lax regulatory treatment for the sake of
better access to public markets.
Table 2 shows that, despite their limited contribution to market liquidity and
trading volume, firms listed on the basic segment still represent a majority of the formally
publicly traded companies in Brazil – hence their clout in opposing comprehensive legal
reform and the importance of the fact that they were allowed to remain subject to the preexisting standards. Other old firms are among the largest and most successful Brazilian
approval. These firms generally opted for a Level 2 listing and committed in their prospectus to a Novo
Mercado migration once the requisite authorizations were obtained.
78
These reorganizations are examples of the “efficient restructurings” discussed in Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 461 (2001). Hansmann and
Kraakman note that efficient restructurings require that the controlling shareholders be able to extract the
capitalized value of private benefits of control when opting for a superior corporate governance regime.
Efficient restructurings, they argue, can be an antidote to the path-dependent nature of corporate ownership
and governance identified by Bebchuk and Roe. See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
79
CVM Advisory Opinion 34/2006. In a highly publicized transaction involving a major Brazilian
telecom, minority shareholders rejected a proposal to migrate from the traditional segment to the Novo
Mercado at conversion ratios by which common shares would be worth 2.6 times more than preferred
shares. Oi!, Brazil’s Shareholding Elite Receives a Black Eye From the Regulator, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.
29, 2006.
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In addition, at least a handful of the firms that migrated to the Novo Mercado from the traditional
segment had as a shareholder the investment arm of Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDESPar), an
early and vocal supporter of the Novo Mercado – implying that the new segment may have been embraced
in these cases owing to factors other than the invisible hand of the market.
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corporations – the so-called “blue chips” – which, due to their size and track record, have
traditionally had privileged access to local and foreign capital markets and other
financing sources. They too have found it unnecessary to commit to more stringent
governance levels, and have at most migrated to Level 1.
Table 2. Number of Listed Firms per Segment (January 2010)
Segment

% Market Cap % Trading Volume

#Firms

%Firms

106

24.5%

23.7%

33.9%

Level 2

19

4.4%

6.5%

5.1%

Level 1

35

8.1%

35.0%

36.4%

Basic and BDRs

273

63.0%

34.8%

24.6%

Total

433

100%

100%

100%

Novo Mercado

Source: BM&F Bovespa

The Novo Mercado contributed to changing the ownership structure of Brazilian
companies by eliminating, for listed companies, the previously pervasive wedge between
voting and cash-flow rights. The result was to increase the cost of voting shares for a
controlling shareholder. Novo Mercado firms therefore have a significantly higher
degree of dispersion of voting shares than those listed in other segments.81 Moreover, the
Novo Mercado also encouraged the rise of the few truly widely held companies in Brazil,
a phenomenon that was widely acclaimed by both local media and scholars.82
In addition, many Novo Mercado firms are party to shareholder agreements
among major blockholders,83 which have enabled some firms to maintain an intermediate
level of shareholder distribution between a single controlling shareholder on the one
hand, and widely-dispersed ownership on the other. Multi-party shareholders agreements
can, under certain conditions, help reduce agency costs by combining shareholder
oversight of management with the absence of a single dominant shareholder that could
easily expropriate the minority without peer supervision. So long as the blockholder
parties to a shareholder agreement are independent of each other, the ability of the
controlling coalition to consistently realize private benefits of control are constrained by
collective action problems and by the difficulty of agreeing upon and contracting over
expropriation methods and levels. Shared control arrangements therefore have some
promise as a pre-commitment mechanism to avoid the extraction of private benefits of
control in countries with insufficient legal protection against affiliate transactions, as is
the case of Brazil.84
81

See Érica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated Towards Dispersed
Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
439 (2009).
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Id. at 446.
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Id. at 474.
84
Although many of the existing shareholder agreements are among related parties alone, raising concerns
that they effectively create a potentially opportunistic controlling coalition, others arguably exhibit
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Yet despite the emergence of a few widely-held companies and the evolution
toward intermediate ownership structures based on blockholdings, it is easy to overstate
the extent of the shift toward ownership dispersion in the Novo Mercado.85 First,
dispersed ownership is often too loosely defined. Brazilian commentators and Novo
Mercado regulators define “dispersed control” as the absence of any individual
shareholder or group holding at least 50% of the company’s voting stock.86 Hence, many
companies that are labeled as having dispersed ownership structures in Brazil actually
have a major blockholder that would be treated as a controlling owner in other
jurisdictions.87 Moreover, the vast majority of Novo Mercado firms have adopted in their
bylaws enhanced mandatory bid rules triggered at a lower threshold and imposing a
higher premium than the Novo Mercado standards.88 These enhanced mandatory bid
rules, as well as shareholder agreements, allow small groups of major shareholders to
exercise uncontested control even though no single shareholder holds a majority of voting
shares.
Although the Novo Mercado is by no means the only factor that contributed to the
capital market boom in Brazil in recent years,89 the expansion of Brazilian capital
markets following the Novo Mercado’s launch was remarkable. In 2007, Brazil was the
third most active IPO market in the world, after China and the U.S., and was responsible

independence. Unlike a single controlling shareholder or an affiliated controlling group, unrelated
blockholders face coordination problems in expropriating minority shareholders and dividing the respective
proceeds, as they are unable to write legal contracts to that effect. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer,
Ownership and Control of German Corporations, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 943 (2001) (finding that blockholders
in German firms effectively discipline management and extract low private benefits of control).
85
As of 2008, Level 1 firms (where many of the old, traditional Brazilian firms are listed) still had on
average slightly more widely distributed shareholdings as a percentage of total capital than Novo Mercado
companies – though this is not the case if one counts only voting shares. See Gorga, supra note 113, at 856.
86
Novo Mercado Listing Rules (defining “diffuse control” as the control exerted by a shareholder who
holds less than 50% of the company’s capital stock). See also, Gorga, supra note 113, at 27.
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For example, the law-and-finance literature adopts a substantially lower threshold to ascertain the
existence of a controlling shareholder. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership around the World,
54 J. FIN. 471, 491 (1999) (using a 10% threshold to determine control).
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52-week high price, thus effectively serving as a takeover shield. Moreover, many such clauses were
drafted as dead hand devices – that is, neither shareholders nor the boards can alter their content without
first offering to buy out the remaining shareholders under the existing criteria. Nevertheless, the CVM has
recently asserted that these “immutable” provisions in firm bylaws are invalid under Brazilian law. See
CVM Advisory Opinion 36/2009.
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Improvements in domestic macroeconomic conditions, including the decline in interest rates of Brazilian
public bonds, and booming international financial markets were also key to the renaissance in Brazil’s
capital markets starting in 2004. Previously, the combination of high inflation, staggering interest rates,
and unstable economic policy had created an unsuitable environment that deterred Brazil’s capital market
development. See, e.g., S. Wade Angus & Mariana Pargendler, Opportunities and Challenges for Foreign
Private Equity Investors in Brazil 63, 73, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH BRAZIL
(Beatriz Franco et al. eds., 2008).
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for 10% of the volume of such offerings worldwide.90 By mid 2008, Brazil’s stock
market capitalization for the first time equaled its GDP,91 and the Novo Mercado alone
had 100 listings. Figure 3 shows that the index of firms listed on the premium corporate
governance segments (Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado) (“IGC”) has consistently
outperformed both the index composed of the 50 most traded stocks (“IBRX50”) and the
index representing 80% of the exchange’s trading volume (“Ibovespa”).92
Figure 3. Evolution of Stock Indices at BM&F Bovespa

Source: BM&F Bovespa

Just like its counterparts around the world, Brazil’s capital markets suffered a
significant setback beginning in the second half of 2008, but they have also been among
the first to recover from the global financial downturn (see Figure 3).93 The São Paulo
Stock Exchange was home to the largest IPO worldwide through the first three quarters
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of 2009, which, at approximately $8 billion, was the largest in its history.94 The Novo
Mercado’s apparent success to date has not gone unnoticed by stock exchanges in other
developing countries. Major stock exchanges in India and the Philippines are drawing on
Brazil’s experiment as they design their own corporate governance listing standards.95

III.

Other Examples of Regulatory Dualism in Corporate Law

Brazil’s Novo Mercado offers a paradigmatic example of regulatory dualism as a
self-conscious strategy in which the reformist regulatory regime was deliberately
implemented to circumvent a strong version of the Olson problem. But there are other
prominent examples of regulatory dualism that serve to diffuse political opposition from
existing elites. Because the Olson problem is pervasive, and in no way limited to
developing countries,96 regulatory dualism has broad application as a means of
facilitating economic growth. Nor is regulatory dualism wholly a recent legal
development.97 The medieval law merchant was arguably an example, in which a transnational body of commercial law – distinct from the general law of the era, and with its
own separate courts – arose among merchants across Europe.98
We examine here three further examples of regulatory dualism in the reform of
corporate and capital markets law: one similar to Brazil’s except for its conspicuous
failure, and two others that differ markedly from the Brazilian approach in the source of
authority for the reformist regime.
A. The Frankfurt Neuer Markt
Although Germany had vigorous equity markets in the early twentieth century, by
the end of World War II its economy became largely dependent on bank financing.99
94
Lynn Cowan & Rogerio Jelmayer, Year’s Biggest IPOS Make Debuts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009. Banco
Santander S.A., as other banks going public in recent years, opted for a Level 2 listing.
95
Inspiration from the East: Encouraged by the Novo Mercado’s Success, the Philippines and India
Create Special Listing Tiers in Their Own Stock Exchanges, 72 CAPITAL ABERTO (Aug. 2009).
96
OLSON, supra note 3, at 3 (citing Britain after World War II as the most notable case of relative decline
owing to the harmful influence of powerful interest groups).
97
TULIO ASCARELLI, PANORAMA DO DIREITO COMERCIAL (1947) (noting that duality in private law, in
which a new legal regime emerges parallel to the traditional system, only to later achieve universal
application, is pervasive in legal evolution).
98
See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY (2003) (arguing that “medieval
law merchant supported a predominantly private commercial order, generating merchant laws and
institutions that operated outside the local political economy of the period”); Francesco Galgano, Lex
Mercatoria (2001) (describing the history of the lex mercatoria as a body of law directly created and
applied by the merchant class, without the mediation of general politics); ASCARELLI, supra note 97 (noting
that the economic demands relating to the dynamism of the emerging commerce demanded a departure
from the civil law principles, which continued to govern agrarian relations). But see Stephen E. Sachs,
From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 685 (2006) (arguing that, contrary to the conventional view, medieval merchants were largely subject
to local laws and customs, which varied substantially).
99
Eric Nowak, Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation in Germany 426, in THE GERMAN
FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Jan Pieter Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds., 2004) (noting that prior to World
War I, Germany’s stock markets boasted nearly 1,200 listed companies compared to the approximately 600
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange). See Franks et. al., supra note 2 (describing German stock
markets prior to the mid-20th century)._

27

From 1965 to 1996, only 434 companies went public on the Frankfurt Deutsche Börse,
Germany’s principal stock exchange.100 Germany’s publicly traded corporations were
mostly large, mature firms, displaying an average 55 years of existence by the time of
their IPO.101
While the bank-centered corporate finance regime served Germany well in the
immediate post-war period, a wave of bankruptcies in the 1980s focused attention on the
highly leveraged capital structure of German firms and the perceived “equity gap”
compared to other developed economies.102 In 1987, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
decided to address this problem by lowering entry barriers to equity markets. The
compromise solution was to create, in addition to the existing Official Market (Amtlicher
Handel) and the Unregulated Market (Freiverkehr), an intermediate Regulated Market
(Geregelter Markt) subject to less stringent requirements than the Official Market in
order to accommodate the needs of small and mid-cap firms.103 The Regulated Market,
however, failed to attract a significant number of listings and afford sufficient liquidity.104
Ten years later, to halt the flight of German new listings to the NASDAQ, the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange in May 1997 created yet another listing segment. The Neuer
Markt targeted high-growth firms in a period in which European stock exchanges were
competing to provide exit opportunities to venture capitalists.105 The need to find
financing alternatives for start-ups was especially acute in Germany, since banks had
come under increasing criticism for their unwillingness to finance high-tech firms.106
While its predecessors aimed at attracting entrants by exempting young firms from the
most stringent requirements for a mainstream listing, the Neuer Markt took the opposite
stance. Like Brazil’s Novo Mercado, the Neuer Markt was more, not less, regulated than
Germany’s official segment, whose requirements were left untouched by this new
initiative.107 As La Porta et al. have recognized, the Olson problem was a driving force
behind Germany’s creation of the Neuer Markt, as established and bank-dominated
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German firms were generally hostile to changes in their legal regime.108 In short, the
Neuer Markt was a clear example of regulatory dualism.
Neuer Markt firms were required to sell only common, rather than non-voting
preferred shares; ensure a 25% minimum free-float; report earnings quarterly in English
and German, in accordance with IAS or U.S. GAAP; provide for a lock-up prohibiting
sales by the original shareholders for six months after the initial offering; obtain two
sponsors responsible for the liquidity and tradability of the shares; and raise at least 50%
of the offer’s value in new equity. Only high-growth firms having at least a three-year
track record and a minimum of €1.5 million in net equity were eligible for a Neuer Markt
listing.109 The Deutsche Börse could deny a Neuer Markt application despite a firm’s
compliance with the segment’s formal requirements when it deemed that the admission
would be “contrary to the protection of the interests of the investors” or “lead to damage
of significant public interests.”110 An arbitration panel was organized by the Deutsche
Börse to decide disputes about Neuer Markt admission and enforcement decisions.111
Notwithstanding the initial skepticism about an over-regulatory approach,112 the
Neuer Markt was quite successful in its first years. At its peak in early 2000 it had more
than 300 listings and a market capitalization exceeding $400 billion.113 Moreover, the
Neuer Markt’s focus on individual investors helped to more than double the equity
ownership of German adults over a three-year period.114 The media credited the segment
for overriding Germany’s legendary lack of an “equity culture.”115
The Neuer Markt became the envy of its European competitors, giving rise to the
rapid adoption of regulatory dualism in other countries.116 High-growth listing segments
in Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, and Milan attempted to emulate at least some of the Neuer
Markt’s requirements.117 A few years later, Europe would have some 30 special listing
segments for small-cap companies.118 In addition, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange sought
to reproduce the Neuer Markt in a 1999 experiment by creating the SMAX, a premium
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listing standard aimed at small and medium-cap firms in the Old Economy which
contained most of the Neuer Markt’s transparency requirements.119
The Neuer Markt’s rigorous requirements were only one component of the
segment’s success. Another critical element was the general optimism about the New
Economy, which boosted the segment’s share price performance. From the onset, the
Deutsche Börse emphasized the segment’s flagship index as a marketing device.120 In the
three years after its launch, the Neuer Markt index rose nearly tenfold, which helped lure
additional investors.121
The Neuer Markt flourished so long as its two pillars – corporate governance
integrity and confidence in the New Economy – remained intact. The burst of the
dot.com bubble in mid 2000 unsettled both foundations. The Neuer Markt stock index
eventually lost 96% of its peak value. But market corrections based on the expected
performance of high-tech firms were not the only cause of the stock price decline. The
Neuer Markt also witnessed an array of corporate scandals, ranging from insider trading
to outright fraud, which progressively tarnished the segment’s reputation.
MobilCom, whose share prices initially followed the index’s ten-fold rise, was
left on the brink of bankruptcy after a self-dealing scandal involving an investment
vehicle owned by its founder’s wife.122 Comroad, a traffic-navigation technology firm,
turned out to have fabricated nearly all of its reported revenue.123 Internet advertiser
Adpepper reduced its earnings expectations less than one month after its IPO.124 The
required sponsors for Informatec, a software company, quit after the firm made overly
rosy statements about its pending contracts.125 The founder of EM.TV, a media
company, breached the mandatory lock-up requirement and sold nearly 200,000 shares
within six months of the initial offering.126 Moreover, a regulatory loophole allowing
company founders to sell their shares after the initial six-month lock-up period without
market disclosure consistently distorted trading in less liquid Neuer Markt firms.127
In fact, the Neuer Markt experienced enforcement deficiencies from the outset. As
of mid-2000, it had issued numerous private reprimands, but had not levied a single
fine.128 It was not until 2001 that the Deutsche Börse raised its maximum fine for
individual violations tenfold to 100,000 Euros, which was still a modest amount for most
companies.129
Lax enforcement of the existing requirements was not the only weakness of the
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Neuer Markt that the market crisis exposed. Revising the listing standards to address
new circumstances also proved to be problematic. Because those standards were
embodied in a private legal agreement between the Deutsche Börse and each listed firm,
the Neuer Markt initially touted its flexibility to adjust its rules in light of changing
conditions.130 However, the seeming advantage of the Neuer Markt’s private contractual
character soon backfired. German courts concluded that the Neuer Markt’s private law
nature prevented the Deutsche Börse from unilaterally revising the listing rules without
regard to the interests of issuers, thus frustrating the Exchange’s attempt to automatically
delist “penny stocks” following the market crash.131
Just as the Neuer Markt’s reputation for firm quality and market integrity
generated positive externalities in its first years, the proliferation of corporate scandals
and the economic collapse of so many of its firms eventually undermined the credibility
of the entire pool.132 Indeed, much of the initial pressure to strengthen the existing
listing requirements did not come from investors or regulators, but from some of the
segment’s top listed firms, which threatened to leave the segment if the exchange did not
act quickly to rebuild its reputation.133 The Neuer Markt, once a quality seal, became a
“synonym for failure.”134 After significant brand damage, the Deutsche Börse
discontinued the Neuer Markt altogether in 2003.135
What lessons are there to be learned from the rise and fall of Frankfurt’s Neuer
Markt? First, the Neuer Markt exposed some of the pitfalls of regulatory dualism when
implemented by private regulatory organizations. The willingness of stock exchanges to
effectively enforce listings requirements, and their ability to update these standards in
light of changing circumstances, clearly matter. Moreover, the Neuer Markt’s narrow
industry focus on high-tech companies turned out to be a major liability when macroeconomic conditions changed, thus suggesting that a more diversified “new market”
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strategy is more likely to survive over time. We address each of these issues in greater
detail in Part V below. Second, timing and luck are critical; were it not for a major
bubble burst in its early years, the Neuer Markt might well have survived. Finally, failure
might not mean total failure. The Neuer Markt ultimately collapsed, but in the meantime
it induced a significant rise in stock ownership among German households, thus
increasing the constituencies pushing for greater investor protection. The Neuer Markt’s
disclosure standards, once exceptional, are now mandatory for all listed firms in
Germany.
B.

Corporate Chartering in the United States

The success of the United States in developing a strong body of investor
protection law can be understood, in important part, as the fruit of an ongoing system of
regulatory dualism. To be sure, the most significant pieces of investor protection
legislation in the United States, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, are mandatory in nature and apply to all publicly traded corporations alike.
But these statutes were enacted during the Great Depression following the stock market
crash of 1929, in a period of broad regulatory overhaul. That is, much of the law
protecting investors in the United States emerged in a period of cataclysm – typical of the
circumstances in which, in Olson’s view, the blocking power of existing elites can be
overcome.
In the less cataclysmic political climate that both preceded and followed the
1930s, however, an important driver of legal evolution in the corporate arena has been the
U.S. system of state-level corporate chartering. This system combines an “internal affairs
doctrine” (according to which the laws of the state of incorporation govern the
relationship between shareholders, directors, and managers) with freedom of choice as to
state of incorporation without regard to the location of the firm’s operations. The
existing literature views the system largely in terms of regulatory competition.
Advocates famously see the result as a “race to the top,” with competition for charters
putting pressure on all states to improve their corporate law. Critics, in contrast, see a
“race to the bottom,” putting pressure on all states to eliminate protections for
noncontrolling shareholders. And skeptics see little evidence of competition at all, with
only Delaware making much effort to attract corporate charters.136 It is a mistake,
however, to view the U.S. system of corporate chartering as if all states were seeking (or
failing to seek) to serve the chartering needs of the same firms, as in regulatory
competition. Rather, that system is, in large part, best interpreted as an example of
regulatory dualism.

136

The canonical sources for the two polar views of the effects of regulatory competition are, of course,
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 5 (1974),
and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977). We will not offer here a review of the large literature that has been built on the theme of
regulatory competition.

32

1.

General Corporation Chartering

Empirically, U.S. corporations either incorporate in the state of their principal
place of business or in Delaware.137 The motivations for incorporating a firm in its home
state appear very much of the Olson type.138 Local businesspersons have strong influence
on local politicians and courts, and hence on the structure of state corporate law –
including protection from takeovers, and particularly takeovers from out of state. State
legislatures have not only enacted anti-takeover statutes to protect local firms from
hostile threats in general, but have also passed legislation aimed at shielding specific
target companies from an imminent or potential bid.139 There are abundant examples of
state-level legal reforms that have been hindered by local interest groups.140 While there
is good reason to believe that Delaware corporate law is more managerialist than
efficiency calls for,141 it is distinctly less protective of the interests of controlling
shareholders, managers, and employees than is the corporate law of most other states.
Delaware was, for example, conspicuously a latecomer with respect to antitakeover
legislation, and its constraints on hostile bids are generally milder than those in other
states.142
Incorporating in one’s home state also increases the chances that corporate
litigation will take place in the courts of that state, where judges are more likely to be
particularly sensitive to the interests of local businesspersons. And, going in the other
direction, incorporating locally is probably an effective signal that one considers one’s
interests focused in the home state, and hence increases one’s local political influence.
Delaware, meanwhile, has special characteristics (such as its size, sunk
investment in judicial services, and economic dependence on franchise taxes) that, as
Roberta Romano has prominently observed, render its promise of an adequate corporate
law regime credible and relatively immune from political interference due to constituency
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considerations.143 Complementing, and perhaps making possible these structural barriers
to local political influence, the small state of Delaware also lacks concentrations of labor
organizations, shareholders, and other stakeholders with a direct interest in – and the
political clout to influence – corporate law. Thus, giving local entrepreneurs the choice
of incorporating either in their home state or in Delaware permits established firms to use
their local political influence to maintain a protectionist legal regime of corporate law,
while at the same time giving access to relatively efficient capital markets for those
companies that need to raise substantial amounts of capital on favorable terms that reflect
adequate shareholder protection.
Viewed from this perspective, Delaware corporate law is complementary to,
rather than in competition with, the corporate law of other states. The other states are not
competing for corporate charters from out of state, or even from within state. Rather,
they are providing corporate law to their domestic constituents in response to political
pressure from those constituents. Without Delaware serving as an escape valve for
corporations that want and need a relatively efficient capital markets regime, there would
presumably be much greater pressure to reform the corporate laws of other states to orient
them more strongly toward the interests of noncontrolling shareholders – or,
alternatively, to displace parochial state corporation law entirely by nationalizing
corporate chartering.144 Thus, rather than serving as a competitive constraint on
protectionism in the corporate law of other states, Delaware corporate law arguably
permits other states to offer law that is more protectionist than they otherwise could. And
conversely, without state-level corporation statutes offering a degree of protectionism for
those in control of local firms, a corporation law as market-oriented as Delaware’s might
be politically unsustainable. If, for example, the current system of state-level regulatory
dualism were replaced with a uniform national system of federal corporate chartering,
protectionist political pressures might well produce a body of federal corporate law that is
less efficiently shareholder-oriented than is the law of Delaware.
The U.S. system of regulatory dualism in corporate chartering might seem, in
contrast to Brazil’s Novo Mercado, not an example of a strategy adopted to cope with the
Olson problem, but rather simply a fortuitous natural concomitant of a well-developed
system of federated lawmaking. And clearly the U.S. system was not self-consciously
designed and adopted by a discrete group of actors, as was the Novo Mercado, to
circumvent long-standing political obstacles to reform. We won’t examine here the
complex origins of the U.S. chartering system, which involved issues of competition
policy in addition to corporate governance and finance.145 But its evolution and,
particularly, its continuing survival quite plausibly reflect, in important part, its virtues in
handling the Olson problem through an effective system of regulatory dualism.
It is clear, in any event, that the U.S. system of corporation chartering, with its
liberal choice of law rule, was not dictated by U.S.-style federalism. The legislators and
143

See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. REG. 209 (2006).
144
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that the main
legal competitor of Delaware is the federal government, not other states).
145
See Herbert Hovenkamp, American Merger Policy and the Failure of Corporate Law, in ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 241-67 (1991).

34

courts that, in the late 19th and early 20th century, created the U.S. system of general
corporate chartering, and the interest groups behind the legislatures and courts, could
have chosen sharply different alternatives. Most obviously, corporations could have been
required to incorporate in the state where their principal place of business was located, as
under the “real seat doctrine” that prevailed in much of Europe until the last decade.146
Alternatively, a system of federal chartering could have been adopted that displaced
state-level bank chartering. The system of bank chartering that developed in the U.S. in
fact incorporated both of those approaches simultaneously, and never developed a system
of regulatory dualism. The result, until quite recently, was an extreme version of the
Olson problem in U.S. credit markets that was strongly at variance with the relative
efficiency of the country’s markets for equity capital.
2.

Bank Chartering

The U.S. banking industry was a conspicuous exception to the liberal choice of
law approach adopted for chartering industrial corporations. Throughout the 19th and
most of the 20th century, nearly all states excluded from doing business within their
territory any bank chartered in another state. Indeed, most states went further and also
either prohibited or severely restricted intrastate branching by banks.147 The states
finally began to abandon these restrictions on interstate and intrastate banking in the late
1970s. Only in 1994, by which time most states had eliminated these restrictions, did
Congress finally empower banks in general to engage in nation-wide business, free of
state restrictions.148
The reason for the limitations on interstate and intrastate branching was local
interest group pressure, which dominated the political economy of American banking
from the Jacksonian era onward. Established local bankers did not want competition
from out-of-state banks or from other, larger in-state banks. In this they presumably had
the sympathy of established local merchants who already had well-developed
relationships with local banks, and hence privileged access to the limited supply of credit
that could be provided with the funds obtained from local depositors. New branch offices
of banks from other regions would have meant increased access to capital for the
merchants’ aspiring competitors.149 The losers from the branch banking restrictions,
meanwhile, were the firms that could not be established or grow because of the lack of
credit, the potential consumers and suppliers of those firms, and bank depositors, who
suffered from the absence of competition for their deposits from distant banks and
borrowers.150 The losing groups were, however, poorly organized in political terms. In
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short, for most of its history the U.S. banking industry suffered severely from the Olson
problem.
There was an early effort to break this Olsonian stranglehold that nearly
succeeded. As Olson would predict, it happened in a revolutionary moment, 1863, when
the nation was deep in civil war, the Southern states were out of the legislature, and the
national government was firmly in the hands of the Republicans. In that year and the two
years following, Congress provided for the chartering of national banks that would have
exclusive authority to issue a uniform national currency. The legislation simultaneously
imposed a confiscatory 10% tax on the issue of banknotes by state-chartered banks.
Because banknotes were a principal source of income for the state banks, these
enactments were expected to effectively eliminate state-chartered banks and replace them
with a nationwide system of federally chartered banks. In fact, the number of state banks
decreased by more than 80% in the immediately succeeding years. But the state banks
subsequently found new sources of business – principally through the development of
checking accounts – and began to rebound. And, once the political equilibrium returned
to the status quo ante bellum, the state banks were allowed to flourish under their
protectionist state-level chartering regimes, while the newly created national banks were
subjected to restrictions that prevented them from offering serious competition to state
banks. In particular, subsequent federal legislation provided that federally-chartered
banks could do interstate business, or maintain intrastate branches, only if state-chartered
banks had the same authority under local state law.151
These developments gave rise to what is commonly termed a “dual banking
system,” under which a bank had the alternative of seeking either a federal or a state
charter. The result was not, however, a meaningful degree of regulatory dualism in the
sense that we use the term here. The federally-chartered national banks did not
ultimately offer a solution to the Olson problem in banking.152
The consequence was extraordinary fragmentation in American banking until the
last decades of the 20th century. This pattern contrasted strongly with the highly
concentrated nationwide banking systems in other developed nations. The best empirical
estimates suggest that this fragmentation of the American banking system produced
substantial inefficiencies in the allocation of credit to businesses and in the rates of return
available to depositors.153 It is generally thought responsible for the small role of bankcentered financing for large industrial firms in the United States as opposed to other
leading industrial nations.154
The United States never solved the Olson problem in consumer banking through
the mechanisms of political economy, including in particular regulatory dualism. The old
chartering system finally collapsed in recent decades principally because of changes in
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technology that permitted institutions other than banks, as well as banks located in other
states, to provide effective competition to state-chartered local banks despite the efforts
of the states to shield them.155 Until that happened, individual states were generally
incapable of breaking the political stranglehold of local bankers and permitting out-ofstate banks to do business in the state, or even permitting intra-state banks to compete
with each other beyond the single community in which they were located. Nor were
political forces at the national level capable of overcoming the power of local bankers
and passing legislation either (1) adopting the approach taken to chartering of industrial
corporations by denying states the authority to exclude firms incorporated in other states,
or (2) giving federally-chartered banks authority to operate nationwide, free of restrictive
state regulation. Either of these approaches, and particularly the first, could well have led
to a regime of regulatory dualism like that which developed for chartering industrial
corporations, with state-chartered firms gaining some degree of insulation against market
pressures while sacrificing, perhaps, some degree of access to credit or other market
opportunities available to banks chartered under the alternative nationally-oriented
regime.
Why was the Olson problem more resistant to solution in banking than among
industrial firms? A plausible explanation lies in the structure of the banking industry in
the first half of the 19th century, with its large numbers of local banks that had relatively
homogeneous interests in shielding themselves from competition. Those banks naturally
formed a powerful interest group – and one that could probably count on support, as
suggested above, from established firms to which they provided credit. Moreover, the
restrictive chartering system for these banks, once in place, assured that the industry
would retain its original structure, and hence its political strength. Manufacturing firms,
being more heterogeneous, perhaps could not form themselves into such an effectively
coherent political force, and hence could do no better than maintain local chartering in
the context of regulatory dualism. This reinforces the conclusion – suggested by Brazil’s
experience – that regulatory dualism can be an effective approach to mitigating the Olson
problem when it is only moderately serious, or when it is waning, but not when the elites
are truly well dug in.
Perhaps, moreover, the differing degrees of protectionism afforded banking and
the equity markets were themselves complementary. If, as in most of the rest of the
developed world, an efficient national banking system had developed early on a scale that
could provide substantial industrial financing, there might well have been less pressure
in the United States for an efficient system of equity markets, and the U.S., like Europe,
would have adhered much longer to a system of local state control over the chartering of
industrial firms and the less minority-shareholder-friendly approach to corporate law that
such a system permits. Conversely, if the U.S. had not developed a relatively efficient
system of law to govern its equity markets, there might well have been much stronger
pressure to reform its system of bank chartering to permit the emergence of nationwide
banks of sufficient size to meet the capital needs of large industrial firms. In a sense,
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then, the contrasting systems of chartering for banks and industrial firms in the United
States also constitute regulatory dualism.156
C.
The EU Choice of Corporate Law Regime: Centros and the Societas
Europaea
Two recent changes in the European Union choice of corporate law regime
operate as a form of regulatory dualism by creating a more efficient choice for small
growth-oriented companies while at the same time protecting the positions of the
established political elite by retaining existing regulation for the companies critical to
those positions. In both cases, the dual regulatory regimes were imposed by an external
force, in one case by the European Court of Justice through its Centros decision and in
the other by the EU’s adoption of a regulation and directive allowing the formation of a
corporation under European, as opposed to member state, law.
1.

Centros and Choice of State of Incorporation

Following the European Court of Justice’s decision in Centros, the European
Union’s approach to corporate law regulation, like the U.S. system that it increasingly
156
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resembles, effectively embodies a dual regulatory strategy.157 To see this, assume that
elements of German corporate governance regulation, most notably co-determination, are
ill-suited to the formation and growth of new economy companies.158 But reforming codetermination to eliminate the barriers to the growth of new economy companies directly
confronts the Olson problem: economic growth requires regulatory reform that is blocked
by existing elites whom the reform would disadvantage.159 In the context of codetermination, a plausible compromise might be to exclude new economy companies
from the application of the regulation, while leaving the established large industrial
companies subject to the existing requirement of employee participation in corporate
governance. But here we again confront the Olson problem. Politically powerful
German labor unions oppose any reform of co-determination because of the concern that
any change threatens the entire regime.160
In this circumstance, a regime of regulatory dualism that could not be adopted by
the Bundestag was externally imposed (whether or not intentionally) by the ECJ in its
Centros decision. Centros allows a new corporation to incorporate in any EU state, and
establish its business in any other EU state, even though the state of incorporation’s
corporate governance system may impose fewer restrictions than the country in which the
business is actually carried out and which, prior to Centros, would have been applicable
because of the real seat doctrine.161 For example, after Centros a biotech startup relying
on German scientists for talent could incorporate in the U.K., thereby avoiding the
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maintenance of family control through multiple voting stock and pyramid holdings in return for labor
participation in governance. See Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in
Sweden, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 517, 522 (Randall Morck ed.,
2005) (arguing that an alliance between wealthy families and Social Democrats led to entrenched family
control of corporations in Sweden).
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See Centros, supra note 184; Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), Case C-208/00, 2002 E.C.R. 9919; Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., Case C-167/01 2003 E.C.R. 10155. Some question remains as to whether Centros actually
prevents Germany from protecting co-determination. While Centros prevents Germany from preventing
German businesses from incorporating elsewhere, some argue that Germany nonetheless could impose codetermination by legislation on such “pseudo-foreign” companies regardless of their state of incorporation.
See Jens Dammann, The Future of Co-Determination, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607 (2003). Germany
has not passed such legislation. Even assuming that such legislation would not conflict with the treaty, the
effect of Centros was to shift the political burden of going forward with legislation. Before Centros, the
business community required legislation to restrict co-determination, which the labor unions could block.
After Centros, the labor unions required legislation to overcome Centros, which business community could
block.
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eventual application of the German co-determination regime if the startup proves
successful, while still retaining its German business location. At the same time, existing
large German companies remain subject to co-determination because of the significant
remaining barriers to shifting country of incorporation, whether through merger162 or via
direct transfer of state of incorporation.163
Thus, in practice Centros imposed regulatory dualism with respect to
codetermination. New companies that are most likely to need access to new equity
capital can opt out of co-determination by foreign incorporation and thereby avoid
restrictions on efficient organizational structure.164 At the same time, the sources and
focus of labor’s political power – existing large companies – remain subject to local
regulation, at least until newly established firms become so large and numerous as to
dominate the local political scene.165
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The typical method for an established company to switch its state of incorporation is to merge the
existing company into a subsidiary newly formed in the destination state. While the E.U. Cross-Border
Merger Directive, 2005/56/EC of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of companies with share
capital, OJ 2005 L 310/1, generally facilitates cross-border mergers, it is not of much help if the goal is to
avoid employee governance participation. If the existing state of incorporation requires worker
participation and the destination state does not, as contemplated here, the directive imposes a set of
standard employee governance rules. See Mathias E. Siems, The European Directive on Cross-Border
Mergers: An International Model, in CORPORATE MERGERS 156 (P.L. Jayanthi Reddy ed., 2008).
163
A second method by which to shift a corporation’s state of incorporation is to simply transfer state of
incorporation, accomplished by dissolving the existing corporation and reincorporating it the target
jurisdiction. This process is said to be unworkable. “Given the high costs involved, the time involved and
the related administrative burden, with sometimes more than 35 procedural steps to overcome, this hardly
ever occurs and European companies are, in practice, deprived of the possibility of moving their place of
registration within the EU.” Impact Assessment on the Directive on the Cross-border Transfer of
Registered Office, SEC (2007) 1707 (Dec. 12, 2007). While the European Commission has determined not
to proceed with a transfer of registered office directive, the proposals all assumed that employee
participation would be protected in much the same fashion as in the cross-border merger directive. See id.,
Resolution of European Parliament, 2008/2196 (INI) (March 10, 2009) (recommending a transfer of
registered office directive).
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A slightly more nuanced formulation of this point recognizes that the Centros dual regulatory regime
provides companies a choice only with respect to worker participation imposed by the corporate
governance system. Worker participation imposed by other regulatory regimes, like workers councils
imposed by labor law, cannot be avoided by foreign incorporation.
165
To some extent, the text overstates the exit barriers confronting established German corporations. The
maintenance of employee participation in governance required by the Cross-Border Merger Directive is
diluted if the surviving firm then engages in another merger with a company chartered in the same member
state. In that event, the Directive requires that employee participation be maintained only for an additional
three years. Directive 2005/56/EC, Art. 16, sec. 7. Since the language of the directive refers only to
“subsequent domestic mergers” (emphasis added), an argument is available that changes in the legal form
of the surviving company other than by merger will “launder” the employee participation requirement
without the three-year lag. Similarly, a German company might accomplish the same result by a division,
thereby shifting the state of incorporation of a portion of its business by a non-merger technique that falls
under Centros’ freedom of establishment regime but outside the application of the Cross-Border Merger
Directive and its protection of employee participation in governance. See Lone L. Hanson, Moving and
Decision Across National Borders – When Case Law Breaks Through Barriers and Overtakes Directives, 1
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 181 (2007). Finally, simple reincorporation may be available after the European Court
of Justice’s decision in Cartesio, C-210/06, which constrains a member state from restricting
reincorporation by treating it as a liquidation under local law.
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2.

The Societas Europaea

An alternative approach to avoiding co-determination that is available to German
new economy companies – selecting the form of a Societas Europaea (SE) or “European
Company” formed under EU law as opposed to the corporate law of a member state –
creates a dual regulatory structure similar to that established by Centros. The regulation
and directive establishing the Societas Europaea166 require that a company subject to
some level of co-determination before becoming a European Company remain subject to
that level of employee board participation unless employees agree to changes.167 Thus, a
German company that has fewer than 500 employees when becoming a European
Company is not subject to co-determination at all; the supervisory board of a company
with more than 500 but fewer than 2000 employees is required to have only one-third
worker representatives. Most important, the German company’s co-determination
obligation is frozen at the time it becomes a European Company; future growth does not
matter. A company with fewer than 500 employees at the time of its conversion is
forever free of co-determination, and a company with between 500 and 2,000 employees
will be subject only to the one-third employee director requirement regardless of further
growth in its work force.168 Large companies with more than 2,000 employees, however,
are locked in to the requirement that one-half the supervisory board be employee
representatives. As with Centros, the European Company provisions allow small
companies to avoid co-determination, but protect existing labor influence by retaining
full co-determination for large established companies.
While different in structure than the Brazilian Novo Mercado strategy, both
Centros and the Societas Europaea option have similar effects on the Olson problem:
they provide a mechanism that lets the new economy develop while leaving the existing
power structure – labor in the case of co-determination – protected.169 And like the Novo
Mercado, Centros and the Societas Europaea operate in the German context not as
Notwithstanding the variety of techniques by which an established German company may with
patience and subtlety escape an employee participation regime, the transactional and legal barriers stand in
sharp contrast to the unfettered discretion of an early stage company simply to choose a more favorable
jurisdiction in which to incorporate. The differential still operates as a dual regulatory regime.
166
Regulation (EC) no. 2157/2001, OJ L 294/1, 10.11.2001; Directive 2001/86/EC, OJ L 294/22,
10.11.2001.
167
Jochem Reichert, Experience with the SE in Germany, 4 UTRECH L. REV. 22, 28 (2008).
168
Id. at 28. Reichert reports that one German company converting to a European Company form disclosed
to its shareholders that one motive for making the shift was to freeze its co-determination obligation at the
one-third level. See also Hors Eidenmüller et al., Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas
Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 (2009) (finding strong evidence
that firms have adopted the SE form in order to avoid or mitigate the effects of mandatory co-determination
laws).
169
As yet, the empirical evidence is consistent with half of the analysis: by and large, existing large firms
have remained incorporated in Germany. With respect to newly formed corporations, however, the largest
number of German located businesses incorporating outside Germany is small local businesses, of the sort
actually involved in Centros, rather than, like the example in the text, venture capital-backed technology
startups. See Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation
and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 241 (2008) (providing empirical evidence concerning German based
firms incorporating in the UK). This was the result of advertising in Germany offering to provide a UK
incorporation at low cost. Barriers to cross border incorporation remain, most notably local lawyers’ lack
of familiarity with local law and language differences.
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invitations to regulatory competition, but as instances of regulatory dualism in which new
and established companies are treated differently, preserving the position of politically
powerful groups while at the same time facilitating new companies’ access to more
efficient organizational structures.

IV.

Related Regulatory Strategies

Regulatory dualism shares some characteristics with other techniques used to
manage the transition from one regulatory regime to another, but has important
differences that help identify its proper domain. In this part, we focus on several of these
alternative techniques. Again, we focus particularly on applications in corporate law,
though all these techniques are applied much more generally.
A. Grandfathering
Grandfathering, as the term is typically used, involves the promulgation of
reformist rules that are mandatory for firms (or other persons) that become subject to the
regulatory regime only after the reformist rules are enacted, while firms that had been
subject to the pre-existing regulatory regime can continue to be governed by that older
regime. Regulatory dualism is distinguished from grandfathering in that the reformist
regime is not mandatory for newly regulated firms; both the established and the reformist
regimes remain available to both old and new firms. In contrast, grandfathering imposes
a mandatory transition process from old to new rules.
Efficiency, including the value of legal predictability and stability, may justify
grandfathering regardless of political constraints – particularly where firms have made
long-term specific investments in reliance on prior law.170 That is, grandfathering can
serve as a form of what we described, in the Introduction, as regulatory diversification.
Nonetheless, grandfathering is also often employed to circumvent the Olson problem. In
corporate law, grandfathering is particularly common with respect to statutory changes
affecting voting rights. Brazil resorted to grandfathering in its 2001 legal reforms by
exempting existing companies when it reduced the statutory ceiling for the issuance of
non-voting preferred shares from two thirds to one half of a firm’s total capital.171 The
U.S. listing rules that substituted for SEC rule 19c-4, barring potentially abusive dual
class recapitalizations, also included a broad grandfather exemption for companies with
existing dual capital structures.172 Similarly, New York’s 1997 amendment to its
Business Corporation Law made a number of changes in voting rules, but specified that
the new rules applied immediately only to companies incorporated in New York after the
effective date of the statute; old companies remained largely unaffected unless they
affirmatively opted into the new regime.173
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Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37
(2008) (arguing that grandfathering is efficient when switching costs are high).
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Despite their grandfathering protection for old public firms, the new statutory rules were rather timid,
and were later dwarfed by the Novo Mercado requirements banning non-voting shares altogether. See Parts
I(a) and (b) supra.
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See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 313.00.
173
Renee L. Crean, Recent Development in New York Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 695, 700 (1998).
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Even though grandfathering may be useful as an ancillary technique to
circumvent the Olson problem in modest legal reforms, it is difficult to find situations
where it has been used to provide an entirely new regulatory scheme. In this important
respect it differs markedly from regulatory dualism, which functions to provide ongoing
parallel systems, as in the corporate governance regimes we examined in previous Parts.
There are several reasons for this disparity. First is the updating problem. If only
a declining number of established firms are affected by the older regulatory regime, both
the incentive and the opportunity may be lacking to make adjustments in that regime to
maintain its efficiency even in serving the needs of the firms it covers. Indeed, any
changes in the established regime may be questionable as inconsistent with the
commitment to stasis involved in grandfathering. A second problem with grandfathering
involves its apparent legitimacy. By its nature – indeed, by its very name – a
grandfathered regime has an air of being antiquated, and increasingly so over time. The
use of grandfathering, as opposed to regulatory dualism, reflects a fundamentally
different assessment of the value of the two regulatory regimes. Grandfathering
eliminates the prior regulatory structure in favor of one whose mandatory character going
forward makes a clear statement of relative efficiency; as a limited concession, firms that
have specific investments in the old regime may continue it. In contrast, regulatory
dualism is at least facially agnostic with respect to the relative values of the business
arrangements that each regime sanctions. As a matter of politics, this is a point of
particular significance in dealing with the Olson problem.
Third, concerns about disparate treatment before the law can generate hostility
towards grandfathering.174 Regulatory dualism has the advantage that both the old and
the new regime remain available to all. And finally, grandfathering, by providing new
rules that are mandatory only for new firms, may be particularly subject to opportunistic
manipulation to the further benefit of the established firms. In particular, established
firms that are protected by the grandfathered rules may use their influence to distort the
rules applicable to new firms, imposing on the new firms onerous and inefficient
statutory requirements that, though nominally protective of the public (such as
noncontrolling shareholders), in fact erect barriers to entry that shield the established
firms from competition.
B.

Menus

Statutory menus,175 which offer both old and new firms a choice between two or
more alternative rules governing a particular issue within a comprehensive scheme of
regulation, can embody a form of regulatory dualism that is directed at the Olson problem
if, as is often the case, the menu items include both established and reformist rules.
Japan conspicuously employed this strategy when it reengineered its corporate
governance system in 2002. The amendments to the Commercial Code gave firms the
opportunity to adopt a new, Anglo-American corporate governance regime on an opt-in
174

CARVALHOSA, supra note 32 (arguing that the 2001 reform’s different treatment of old and new
Brazilian firms with respect to preferred shares is inequitable and unconstitutional).
175
On menus in general, particularly in the context of corporate law, see Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical
Examination, http://ssrn.com/abstract=924578 (2007).
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basis.176 In particular, firms could choose between the traditional Japanese system based
on a board of auditors (kansayaku secchi kaisha) and a U.S.-style board-centered
corporate governance regime (iinkai secchi). The legislature’s decision to offer a choice,
rather than a mandatory shift to a board-centered system as originally proposed, was a
response to opposition from traditionalists both within and outside the government who
objected to the imposition of a new governance system. Seven years after the reform,
112 publicly traded firms had taken advantage of the option to embrace the new
system.177
Another familiar example of the menu approach in the U.S. is section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law.178 This section effectively gave corporations a
choice between two alternative liability regimes for violations of corporate directors’
duty of care: a very low “reform” standard that virtually eliminates director personal
liability for duty of care violations, and a potentially higher existing standard – the
Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Van Gorkom,179 in response to which
Section 102(b)(7) was enacted.180
The statutory menu approach to regulatory dualism has the weakness, however,
that it seeks to embed the reformist regime in the same statute that provides the
established regime. The result is that the reformist regime, in all its details, must be
accepted by the political forces that have long shielded the established regime. In the
most successful approaches to regulatory dualism, in contrast, the reformist regime has
been created and maintained by an institution – such as a stock exchange or another
federated state – that is to some degree independent of the political forces supporting the
established regime. We consider this question of institutional choice more carefully
below.181
C. Default Rules
A more liberal approach than menus to the creation of alternative regulatory
regimes is to delegate to the regulated firms themselves the task of designing the
reformist (or, in some cases, the established) regime. This is done commonly in
corporate law by enacting portions of the established regime in the form of default rules
from which firms are free to deviate by specific alternative provisions in their charters.
176

See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese
Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (2005).
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Robert N. Eberhart, Comparative Governance Systems and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence from
Japan’s Natural Experiment, Working Paper, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center,
Stanford University (Aug. 2009). Companies that adopted the iinkai secchi structure initially improved
their performance compared to industry competitors that retained the traditional governance structure. Id.
This advantage diminished after two years, illustrating the existence of an informal item on the menu.
Because the traditional system was sufficiently malleable to allow the adoption of some elements of the
iinkai secchi structure without a statutory change, informal selection of an intermediate combination of
attributes may have reduced the performance differences between the two regulatory regimes. Id. Thus,
depending on the context, informal alternatives may be nested within a menu structure’s formal choices.
178
Del Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
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488 A.2d 858 (Del. Supr., 1985).
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company adopted the contemplated charter amendment.
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See Part V infra.
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This approach has the advantage of permitting reformist regimes that are tailored to the
needs of each individual firm. It also does not require the creation of a separate
regulatory body to administer the reformist regime.
But simple default rules suffer from three basic weaknesses as a dualist response
to the Olson problem. The first is that privately-contracted alternatives to the established
regime do not bring with them an enforcement mechanism apart from the general modes
of contract enforcement. The second is that the alternatives to those defaults that
individual firms choose may not be well coordinated, resulting in a proliferation of
alternatives that undercuts network effects in signaling, interpretation, and (contractual)
enforcement. And the third, and arguably most serious, weakness of the simple default
rule approach is that it is not a form of regulatory dualism. That is, it does not provide
for a regulatory institution outside the firm that provides the reformist rules, but instead
leaves those rules to be created by contract among the firm’s stakeholders. And the
weakness of contractual rules lies in their amendability, or lack of it. If the special
contractual constraints are subject to easy amendment without unanimous assent of the
affected stakeholders, then there is room for opportunistic changes to the detriment of one
group or another. On the other hand, if all affected stakeholders are given a veto over
amendment of the customized rules, those rules risk becoming outdated and costly as the
firm and its environment change over the many years of its expected lifetime. A thirdparty regulatory institution – whether legislature, court, or agency – can provide, in
effect, “delegated contracting,” altering the rules of internal corporate governance for
firms over time as, and only as, alterations are needed.182 These concerns arguably go far
in explaining the remarkable fact that publicly-traded corporations in the U.S. rarely
deviate from default statutory law in their charters, despite their great freedom to do so.183
Paradoxically, contract terms fare worse than legal rules in adapting to new conditions, as
the experience with Frankfurt’s Neuer Markt shows clearly.
D. Grand Bargains
By definition, regulatory dualism is a second-best solution that allows
policymakers to circumvent the blocking power of incumbents to sweeping, if efficient,
legal reforms. But, at least in theory, regulatory dualism is not the only possible strategy
to address the Olson problem. Simply buying off the existing controlling shareholders
prior to legal reforms is another alternative. For example, in exchange for accepting
sweeping mandatory reform of the rights of noncontrolling shareholders in all
corporations, both old and new, controlling shareholders in established firms might be
given a time-limited right to purchase all of their companies’ publicly-traded shares at
low prices reflecting the weak rights of shareholders under pre-existing law. Those
purchases might be aided by government financing, which could be repaid when the
shares were subsequently resold on the public markets, after the adoption of the legal
reforms, at the higher prices those reforms would induce.
This approach was, in fact, partially employed in Brazil, even if inadvertently. In
permitting controlling shareholders to take their companies private in abusive
182
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transactions in the late 1990s, Brazil effectively reduced the number of actors having a
vested interest in opposing subsequent legal reforms to increase minority rights.184
However, the grand bargain approach also has its limits. In the Brazilian case, it
served to hurt investor confidence in local capital markets but did not sufficiently reduce
the number and political clout of existing publicly-traded firms to enable comprehensive
reform and render regulatory dualism redundant. But more ambitious and explicit
attempts to bribe the existing elites to accept legal reforms – such as government bridge
loans for exploitative share repurchases, as described above – are unlikely to be
politically feasible.

V.

Who Provides the Reformist Regime?

As the preceding discussion of default rules suggests, an effective system of
regulatory dualism requires that the reformist regime be provided by a regulatory
authority with some independence from the regulated – and especially the established –
firms. We turn now to the potential sources of that authority.
A. The Problem of a Unitary Lawmaker
In the menu approach to regulatory dualism, a single lawmaker – generally a
legislature – establishes and maintains each of the alternative regulatory regimes. As a
solution to the Olson problem, this approach has the obvious limitation that establishment
of a reformist regime must confront the same interest group pressures that support the
established regime; in comparison, the stock exchanges in the cases of Brazil and
Germany were motivated by their own profit both to open the exchange to a new class of
listing companies and to accomplish this without alienating the existing traditional
companies. Even if elite interests cannot entirely block reform through a new legislative
menu, they may succeed in limiting the menu to meager choices. To be sure, a single
legislature might find it easiest to accommodate both the establishment and reformist
political forces by establishing dual regimes rather than, for example, seeking to develop
a single compromise regime. The recent Japanese corporate governance reforms are an
example. But, though they aroused intense political opposition,185 those reforms are less
than earthshaking, representing only a modest deviation from Japan’s managerialist
system of corporate governance, and they have been taken up by only very few
companies. And Delaware’s menu approach to directors’ duty of care has collapsed into
near meaninglessness, as firms have almost uniformly adopted exculpatory provisions as
permitted by 102(b)(7), while the courts have both retreated from what momentarily
seemed a higher standard of care and expanded the content of the duty of loyalty (which
is not subject to exculpation under 102(b)(7)) to encompass some obligations previously
covered by the duty of care,186 hence arguably removing most of the difference between
the old and the new regime.187
184
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With perhaps the exception of the Japanese case, it is in fact difficult to find an
example of a single jurisdiction that offers two markedly alternative systems of corporate
law, one established and one reformist. In theory, it should be perfectly possible.
Delaware, for example, might attract to itself even more of the corporate charter business
in the United States if it were to offer, in addition to its current mildly reformist
corporation statute, an alternative corporation statute that is much more protective of the
interests of managers and controlling shareholders.188 Alternatively, states with
corporation statutes that currently cater to managers and controlling shareholders could
adopt, in addition, an alternative statute that is as or more protective of noncontrolling
shareholders as Delaware’s corporation law. But – aside from an arguably quixotic
recent effort in North Dakota189 – we don’t see this. Strong forms of regulatory dualism
seem to require that the alternative regulatory regimes be promulgated and maintained by
separate authorities that are at least to some degree subject to different political pressures.
Each of the prominent examples of regulatory dualism we have examined in earlier
sections of this article has this character. We proceed to examine several approaches of
this type, exhibiting increasing degrees of political isolation for the reformist regime.
B.

Dualism via Private Regulatory Organizations

One alternative is for the reformist regime to be provided by a third-party private
or semi-private organization that is relatively independent of the governmental
institutions that provide the established regime. Both Brazil’s Novo Mercado and
Germany’s Neuer Markt are examples of this approach, in which a stock exchange acts as
failed to discharge their fiduciary obligations in good faith). See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell,
Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) (defending the use
of the duty of good faith to enlarge the scope of director liability for breach of the duty of loyalty); Stephen
M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 597 (2008)
(attributing the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stone as “another case in which section 102(b)(7)
seems to be driving the analysis”).
187
For some perspective on the tortured evolution of the duty of care under Delaware law, see William T.
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).
188
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ownership. See JESSE CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS C.7 (2008)(describing development of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing as an
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Delaware understands that there is little market for higher standards. Daines & Klausner, supra note 183.
189
Under a 2007 reform to the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act promoted by corporate
governances advocates, firms incorporated under North Dakota law after July 1, 2007 can insert a provision
in their articles of incorporation that subjects them to a bundle of strong shareholder rights, including
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presumably free to reincorporate and thereby take advantage of the new shareholder-oriented provisions,
both the established and the reformist regimes are available to both old and new firms, making this a
straightforward example of regulatory dualism.
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the regulatory body. Following a pattern typical in the industry, both of these exchanges
were, at the time the new market reforms were adopted, mutual organizations controlled
by the brokers and dealers who had trading privileges on the exchanges, and then were
converted to investor-owned firms. Under both forms of ownership, the returns to those
who control the exchanges is maximized by maximizing the volume of securities that are
traded and the prices at which those securities trade. This provides an incentive, in turn,
for the exchanges to establish rules of corporate governance that are relatively favorable
toward noncontrolling shareholders. And since there are economies of scale and scope in
stock exchanges, the exchanges typically have substantial market power over companies
whose stocks the exchanges list for trading. There is a limit to that market power,
however, so that if the exchanges are too aggressive in imposing strict rules of corporate
governance upon listed firms, at some point they will start to lose listings as firms seek
other venues where their shares can trade. Additionally, the particular regulatory
structure in which a stock exchange operates will constrain their freedom of action. For
example, both in the U.S. and in Brazil, the requirement that exchanges secure SEC (or,
in Brazil’s case, CVM) approval of changes in their rules provides a tangency between
private and public action that creates an opportunity for the Olson problem to inhibit
reform by an exchange more directly.
1.

Enforcement

Private organizations such as stock exchanges are handicapped by lacking the
enforcement tools – and in particular the punishments – available to governmental
bodies. Nonetheless, private organizations can deploy some enforcement tools that go
beyond mere contract enforcement. The new markets in Brazil and Frankfurt both had
the power – granted contractually in return for listing privileges – to impose fines upon
firms that deviated from their rules. And ultimately the exchanges could threaten to
delist a deviant firm. As we have seen, however, the Frankfurt Neuer Markt had very
lenient fines and, even so, rarely imposed them – perhaps because it was afraid of
discouraging firms from listing on the exchange.
Weak enforcement contributed to the widespread scandals that undermined the
credibility of the Frankfurt Neuer Markt. Brazil’s Novo Mercado has so far escaped such
problems. Whether its enforcement powers will prove, in the long run, adequate to
support its rigorous listing standards – and the extent to which the CVM will continue to
play an active role in investor protection – remain to be seen.
2.

Network Efficiencies

Unlike individual agreements, but similarly to legal rules, the delegated
contracting provided by a private regulatory organization serves as a focal point for the
coordination of investor expectations, so that shareholders of any individual member firm
acquire an interest in the reputation and reliability of the entire segment. An instance of
investor expropriation at any given listed firm will affect an interest group well beyond
that firm’s shareholders. Consequently, as the number of listed firms and shareholders
relying on these new standards increases, so do its apparent legitimacy and the
probability of enforcement of its provisions.
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But network effects can also undermine a private regulatory organization. A main
reason for the failure of the Neuer Markt in Germany was also a main driving force of its
initial success – that is, its focus on high-tech companies. As the dot.com bubble burst in
the late 1990s, a plunge in stock prices, accompanied by a series of scandals involving
member firms, eroded the credibility of the entire segment. In such circumstances, a
more diversified private regulatory organization such as Brazil’s Novo Mercado (which
is open to any firm willing to comply with its requirements) is more likely to remain
viable.
3.

Revision of Regulations

Even if enforcement deficiencies can be overcome, the main challenge to
establishing a reformist regulatory regime through a private regulatory organization is, as
we have suggested above, adaptation over time. The ability to adapt to new
circumstances is key to protecting noncontrolling shareholders from an ever-growing
spectrum of expropriation opportunities cleverly devised by sophisticated advisors; to
have a comparative advantage, the private organization must avoid the petrification
inherent in public regulation. The inability of Frankfurt’s Neuer Markt to remodel its
requirements in a moment of crisis – a consequence, in important part, of judicial
interpretation of those requirements as contractual in character – provides a cautionary
tale for similar institutions, such as Brazil’s Novo Mercado.
The ability of the São Paulo Stock Exchange to revise the Novo Mercado’s listing
rules over time is constrained by the segment’s institutional design. Unlike its
predecessor Neuer Markt, the Novo Mercado explicitly requires the tacit approval of at
least 2/3 of listed firms to any changes in the listing standards. Subject to CVM approval,
revisions of the listing rules are binding upon all Novo Mercado firms unless 1/3 of them
expressly oppose the changes during a restricted hearing required under the Novo
Mercado regulations.190 Although this qualified majority approval condition, together
with other features of the Novo Mercado, should prevent the courts from treating the
Novo Mercado rules as contracts unalterable without the unanimous consent of the
regulated firms, the result may nonetheless be substantial rigidity in the system. The
incentives of firms to commit to stringent corporate governance requirements, which are
most powerful at the time of their IPO and entry to the Novo Mercado, can easily fade
over time, especially when the firm does not plan a new capital issuance in the near
future. Listed firms will have an incentive to act opportunistically when voting on
stricter regulations, with the consequence that the frequency and quality of amendments
may be suboptimal from a shareholder value perspective.
The Novo Mercado reform system is currently being tested as the São Paulo
Stock Exchange is, for the second time, proposing major changes to the listing standards.
So far, the Novo Mercado has an overall positive track record in amending its
regulations. The listed firms successfully approved changes to the premium listing
standards in late 2005. A few of the changes rendered the listing standards more
permissive, but most of them were stricter in terms of investor protection than the
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original requirements.191 Since 2005, however, the number of Novo Mercado firms has
risen more than five-fold, which might obstruct further substantial revisions.192 Indeed,
the reform process is already running behind schedule, and BM&F Bovespa
representatives have signaled that the large number and heterogeneity of Novo Mercado
firms is a hurdle to sweeping changes to the listing standards. The results remain to be
seen.
4.

Political Independence

Reform through stock exchange listing standards has the advantage that it does
not depend on affirmative legislative action. Indeed, its contractual character may help
insulate it from political interference – an important safeguard given the track records of
developing countries (including Brazil) in reversing statutory investor protections. At the
same time, it remains within the power of the legislature to rein in the exchange’s reforms
if they should go too far in threatening established interests and, as we have seen, the
CVM retains a veto over amendments to the listing standards if they are to apply to
companies voting against their adoption.
An important factor here is that the reformist regime itself will have an effect on
the character of those established interests, for better or for worse. As we have noted,
firms that succeed in attracting capital and growing by virtue of the efficient access to
capital markets afforded them by rigorous private-exchange listing standards may, once
successful, find that those standards are more helpful to their potential competitors than
to themselves, and hence join other established firms in opposing the updating of the
standards, or even their continued existence. In short, yesterday’s economic insurgents
may become today's entrenched elite, re-creating the Olson problem.193
Conversely, and more hopefully, the firms that succeed by virtue of the new
standards may add to the political constituency supporting reform, as will the economic
growth that is expected to come from reform. As capital markets become larger and
more efficient, the number and size of the actors with a stake in their success – which
include not only new companies and their investors, but also corporate lawyers,
accountants, investment bankers, and corporate governance consultants – grows as
well.194 And as the general population benefits from economic growth, reform may gain
support from broader constituencies. As a consequence, the creation of a privatelyorganized dual regulatory regime may lead to broader reform through the legislative
process, allowing a jurisdiction to break with the path-dependent nature of corporate law
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rules as an obstacle to capital markets development.195 In effect, successful reform
catalyzes further reform.
Brazil has in fact seen positive legal and regulatory changes following the success
of the Novo Mercado, which plausibly were reinforced by Brazil’s overall favorable
economic performance during this period. These important changes apply both to old
and new companies, and came rather sooner than the incumbent firms might have
anticipated when the Novo Mercado experiment was launched in 2000. The
Corporations Law was amended once again in 2007 to force convergence of the relatively
lax local accounting standards with International Accounting Principles.196 Brazil’s
CVM has also increasingly advanced the investor protection agenda. Among other
things, it issued an opinion suggesting that the discharge of directors’ fiduciary duties in
freeze-out mergers may require the formation of a special committee of independent
directors and majority-of-the-minority approval requirements.197 In other words, the
controlling shareholder was forced to give up its premium, just the kind of wealth transfer
the fear of which contributed to the Olson problem in the first place. The Commission
has recently showed that its guidelines have teeth when it questioned the procedures
followed by the special committees to appraise the appropriate conversion ratio in a
merger transaction; following the CVM’s negative reaction, the merging parties decided
to abandon the initially proposed discount to preferred shares, which were treated on a
par with common shares in connection with the transaction.198 Moreover, the CVM has
recently revised its disclosure regulations, which are now stricter than the Novo Mercado
standards and are expected to mitigate the existing lack of transparency about executive
compensation in Brazil.199 Likewise, since the launch of the Neuer Markt, and especially
after its collapse, Germany has enacted various pieces of investor protection legislation.
Regulatory dualism can thus serve as an initially conservative, but ultimately
subversive, form of legal change. And as the U.S. experience attests, full convergence to
the new regime is not crucial. The goal of the reformist regime is to support economic
development by allowing firms that do not yet have access to financing to obtain it.
Since the established elites already have financing options, the efficiency consequences
of allowing them to keep the old regime for an indefinite time are of a lesser magnitude
than they would be in other fields, such as in the case of grandfathering of environmental
regulations. In fact, that old firms internalize most of the costs associated with the old
corporate regime may be one reason why regulatory dualism is more widely employed in
contractual areas of the law than in other contexts.
Recognizing the potential for the success of a regulatory dualism strategy to
catalyze further reform and thereby accelerate the shifts in wealth and political power that
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regulatory dualism was intended to moderate raises again the question of why elites did
not block reform in the first place. The outcome of the elite’s decision calculus200 is
sensitive to a number of variables in addition to the slope of the curve of future reforms
and the resulting present value of existing power. For example, those variables interact
with the cost of blocking even moderate reform, including the potential for political
backlash in the form of comprehensive reform. Of course, the values of these variables
are determined by local conditions, with the result that even if a regulatory dualism
strategy is the best way to address the Olson problem in a particular country, whether
such reform be adopted and succeed depends on the parameter values determined by
local conditions. Our analysis indentifies the value of a dual regulatory strategy in the
face of the Olson problem. It does not predict the outcome for a particular country.
C.

Regulatory Dualism across Federated States

Despite the foregoing, a private regulatory organization within a single state
ultimately has only as much autonomy as the government of the state gives it. An
alternative form of regulatory dualism that avoids this problem, to a greater or lesser
extent, is to have the reformist regime provided by a politically independent foreign
government. We have examined two examples of this approach – the U.S. and the EU –
in the context of a federated union of states. Parallel states within a federal system
potentially offer not only a better insulated, but also a more stable and durable, system of
regulatory dualism than is available with a private regulatory organization within a single
state. In the U.S., for example, regulatory dualism in corporate chartering has been
maintained for over a century.
The presence of an overarching federal government provides two obvious
advantages to this form of regulatory dualism. First, the federal government can force the
individual states to permit local firms to elect the regulatory regimes of other states.
Second, the federal government can mitigate the pathologies of predatory dualism. In
particular, they can put a floor on regulatory standards, helping to assure that none of the
member states provides a system of regulation that, if chosen by residents of other
member states, could impose large external costs upon those states. The U.S. federal
government has played this role conspicuously in corporate law by either federalizing, or
threatening to federalize, significant elements of corporate and securities law when the
principal dual regulatory regime, that of Delaware, has permitted excessive opportunism
on the part of controlling shareholders or corporate managers.201 The extent to which the
federal level effectively serves this purpose is contingent both on the structure of a
particular federal system and on the politics of the particular circumstance. For example,
we have seen that regulatory dualism worked well within the U.S. federal structure with
respect to corporate chartering, but could not be successfully established for bank
chartering.
D.

Regulatory Dualism across Independent States

Although federalism can provide a protective context for regulatory dualism, that
strategy, as we have seen, can also be implemented across fully independent states. In
200
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Brazil, prior to the advent of the Novo Mercado, firms seeking access to the capital
markets on attractive terms used the United States, with its rigorous securities laws, as
their reformist dual regime. This was presumably tolerated by the Brazilian government
because it provided a safety valve that released some of the strongest pressures for
corporate and capital markets reform in Brazil itself, while at the same time the costs of
listing in the U.S. were high enough to limit the number of firms that would take
advantage of that opportunity.
The creation of the Novo Mercado has spurred the creation and growth of
corporations in Brazil well beyond what had been achieved simply through access to
listings in the U.S., suggesting the superiority, at present, of the former type of regulatory
dualism. To be sure, advances in transportation and communication technology are likely
to continue to reduce the costs of foreign securities listings and foreign incorporation,
making the latter approach increasingly attractive. Yet governments like that of the U.S.
have little incentive at present to devote their limited enforcement resources to policing
foreign firms, whose transgressions they commonly ignore.202 Consequently, for the
foreseeable future, the Brazilian approach to the regulatory dualism strategy, if it can be
managed, may well remain superior to relying on other nations for the reformist regime.

VI.

Other Applications of Regulatory Dualism

We have focused here on regulatory dualism as a solution to the Olson problem in
corporate and capital markets law. This is not, however, the only field in which
regulatory dualism offers a helpful antidote to the Olson problem.
General commercial contracting offers another example. Even within the United
States, where the law of commercial contracts is relatively uniform (though still clearly
subject to the pressure of established interest groups203), New York has emerged as the
Delaware of contract law. New York contract law and New York courts are chosen over
those of other states, through choice of law and choice of forum clauses, in a striking
proportion of important commercial contracts.204 Outside of the United States, in turn,
associations of commercial arbitrators provide a reformist dual regime of contract
adjudication for parties from countries with poorly developed law or inefficient courts.
And, as a much bolder deployment of regulatory dualism to mitigate the Olson problem
in commercial contracting, it has been proposed that, as a solution to the extreme
inefficiency and corruption of the courts in many developing (and some developed)
countries, merchants who are parties to contracts concerning even purely intra-state
transactions be given broad freedom to choose both foreign law and foreign courts to
govern their disputes, rather than making efficiency in contracting await the far distant
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day when their domestic legal system is finally reformed.205 A similarly motivated
proposal suggests the creation of regional commercial courts as a barrier to existing
national elites protecting their interests at the expense of growth through influencing local
courts.206
We will not further explore here these and other applications of regulatory
dualism. Much of what we have said about regulatory dualism as a reform strategy in the
context of corporate and capital market law, however, extends to applications of the
strategy in other realms as well.

VII. Conclusion: The Promise of Regulatory Dualism
The evolution of corporate law reflects a struggle between allocation and
distribution – the conflict presented by reforms that increase production at the expense of
making the existing economic and political elites worse off. Regulatory dualism in
corporate governance serves to mediate that struggle, providing protection to entrenched
owners and managers for the sake of reducing their opposition to the reforms needed to
develop an efficient system for financing and managing at least a portion of the corporate
sector. Brazil’s current experiment with a “New Market” for corporate share listings
offers a textbook example of this strategy. But regulatory dualism as a strategy for
capital markets reform is not unique to Brazil, nor is it suited just to developing countries.
Indeed, the United States has a long and successful record of regulatory dualism in
corporate law, and the European Union seems now to have set out on the same path.
Germany’s conspicuous recent failure with this strategy in its Neuer Market emphasizes
the need for care, effective enforcement, and – as with all human affairs – luck in its
deployment. But with more systematic attention to the means of deploying the strategy,
and more attention to the political forces whose opposition to reform it is intended to
address, the scope for its successful application may continue to expand. And, as we
have only hinted here, regulatory dualism is a development strategy that has application
well beyond the problems of corporate and capital market law upon which we have
focused.
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